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I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyer represents Parent Corporation. May Lawyer (or another
lawyer in her firm),1 acting on behalf of another client, file suit against
1. By force of the imputed-conflict rule, in general any conflict affecting one lawyer in a law
firm affects all others. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.10(a) (1983)
[hereinafter MODEL RULES] ("When lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by
[cited conflicts rules]"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REspoNsIBrY DR 5-105(D) (1969)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE] ("If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with
him or his firm may accept or continue such representation."); See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW GOVEImG LAWYERS § 203 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (tentatively approved, 1996)
[hereinafter PROPOSEDm FINAL RESTATEMENT ]; ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CoNrOucr 51:2001 (1993) [hereinafter ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL]; 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR. & W. WnLLAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAwyoRNG § 1.10:100 et seq. (1996) [hereinafter HAZARD
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Subsidiary Corporation if Subsidiary is wholly-owned by Parent?2 In
any attempt to answer such a conflict of interest question, one must first
identify whom or what is being represented as client of the challenged
lawyer. In the example, the question is whether Lawyer, when she under-
took to represent Parent, also undertook conflict of interest obligations
that extend as well to Subsidiary. For corporate3 and similar entity cli-
ents, that task has proved notoriously difficult. One difficulty that once
muddied analysis has now been resolved because of the wide consensus
supporting acceptance of the so-called "entity" concept of corporate rep-
resentation.4 Under it, a lawyer representing a corporation is deemed to
represent only the corporate entity, and not-by force of the originating
representation-any constituent of the corporate client, such as a major-
ity shareholder, a high-ranking officer, or the like.'
Acceptance of the entity theory has been beneficial on the whole,
despite perhaps inevitable difficulties in applying it even when dealing
with what is indisputably only one entity.6 However, it has proved of
limited value when the client must be identified among multiple but affil-
iated corporate entities such as parent and subsidiary corporations and
sister corporations.7 Those problems may exist for purposes of both con-
current-representation conflicts' and those involving former clients.9
& HODES ]; CHARLES W. WoLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs § 7.6 (1986) [hereinafter MODERN
LEGAL Ewmcs].
2. The illustration here is of a wholly-owned subsidiary. As will shortly be seen, the problem
is more complex, extending to more than parent-subsidiary relationships (see infra text
accompanying notes 29-36) and to more than corporations (see infra text accompanying notes 80-
90). The cryptic illustration also assumes that there is no basis for finding a direct client-lawyer
relationship between Lawyer and Subsidiary. On the need for care in reaching such a conclusion, see
infra text accompanying notes 73-79.
3. While the differences between various entities is hardly irrelevant for all conflicts
purposes, unless the context requires another term to refer to a particular kind of non-corporate
entity, I here use the conventional shorthand in referring generally to "corporate" conflicts. See
infra text accompanying notes 80-90 & 91-95.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 37-52.
5. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 1, at Rule 1.13(a) (1983) ("A lawyer employed or retained by
an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.");
MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at EC 5-18 (1969) ("A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or
similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee,
representative, or other person connected with the entity .. "). On limitations on the entity theory
with respect to the question whether a lawyer also represents constituents, see infra text
accompanying notes 52-56.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 57-66.
7. On the possibility, which has proved arresting to some, that one can resolve all corporate-
family conflicts problems simply by including all affiliated corporations as among the non-
represented "constituents" of a represented entity, see infra text accompanying notes 137-38.
8. Concurrent-representation conflicts are those produced by a law firm's representation, at
the same time, of two clients with conflicting interests. See generally PROPOSED FiNAL
1999] 297
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Think of this set of client-identification problems as if the task were that
of gathering together for a family portrait all corporate affiliates1° who
are significantly related at any one moment in time. Although the family-
portrait metaphor fits only loosely, I will refer to such questions as the
"lateral" dimension of corporate family conflicts of interest." Beyond
lateral-dimension conflicts, courts have also sometimes differed in
attempting to identify the entity client when the entity has transmogrified
over time.12 That can occur, for example, when a corporate client's
shares are sold to an acquirer,' 3 or when the corporate family picture
arguably has been enlarged because of a merger or acquisition and when
the transmogrifying event is claimed to have significance for conflict
purposes.' 4 Think of this as if the problem were to gather together in one
album all antecedent and successor corporations that are significantly
related for conflicts purposes. Again using the family-album metaphor
only loosely, I refer to this second set of corporate-family conflicts as
"lineal-dimension" conflicts.
Various theories have been advanced to support one "test" or
another for client identification in the case of multiple corporate affili-
ates, but none has gained common acceptance. Those various theories
jostling each other for acceptance are remarkable for their radically dif-
ferent approaches. At the extremes in the lateral-dimension realm are
categorical, per se theories. At the one-large-picture extreme, one rule
posits that a lawyer who represents one member of a multi-member cor-
porate family is always deemed to represent all others as well-what I
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at Ch. 8, topic 3. A clear example of an impermissible conflict (unless
effective consents are obtained) occurs when one set of lawyers in the firm represents Parent
Corporation in Suit 1 while other lawyers represent another client in an otherwise unrelated lawsuit
against Parent Corporation. See id. § 209(2).
9. All jurisdictions now test former-client conflicts of interest by the "substantial
relationship" standard. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 1, at Rule 1.9 (1983); The point of the
substantial-relationship formulation is to protect confidential information probably provided to the
lawyer in the now-terminated representation. There is no further duty owed the former client. See
Charles W. Wolfram, Former Client Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 677, 687-88
(1997) [hereinafter Wolfram, Former Client Conflicts].
10. In an attempt to avoid terminological confusion, I use "affiliates" to refer to members of
the same corporate family. "Constituents" will refer to other persons or entities that have an interest
in a corporate client, such as shareholders. The same corporation, of course, can be both affiliate and
constituent in those senses-as is a parent corporation whose formal legal relationship to the
subsidiary is through share holdings.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 102-257.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 258-68.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 260-61.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 262-68.
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hereafter term the all-affiliates approach.15 At the small-picture extreme,
a competing theory would impose the inflexible rule that a lawyer repre-
senting one such member never (by that fact alone), or hardly ever,16
represents any other affiliated entity-the no-affiliates approach. 7 (The
foregoing characterizes to some extent. In fact, both the all-affiliates and
no-affiliates positions come in multiple variations, many of which admit
more or less expansive exceptions, causing them to converge at least
somewhat.18) Similarly, although comparatively few decisions have yet
analyzed issues of lineal-dimension conflicts, courts have held both that
a lawyer who represents a corporate client in its sale to acquirers either
may19 or may not2° appear adversely to the corporation in subsequent
litigation by the sellers against the buyers. Courts and commentators
have more uniformly approached the somewhat related lineal-dimension
question of the effect of post-representation client mergers and acquisi-
tions on corporate-family conflicts.21 On the other hand, courts and com-
mentators have not commonly recognized that there are indeed the two
different lines of decisions for what I here call the lateral and lineal
dimensions of the client-identify problem, and that they ought to be gov-
erned by quite different considerations. Rather clearly, theory and the
decisions are themselves in conflict and, to some extent, in a state of
disarray.
The disarray is partly a function of lack of authoritative guidance.
Neither of the ABA lawyer codes written in the latter half of this century
addresses the issue. The lawyer codes of Florida and the District of
Columbia were recently amended to do so, with varying results. Florida's
15. See, e.g., Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l, N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (parent- and wholly-owned subsidiary); Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F.
Supp. 1121, 1125-26 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (same); see generally, PROPOSED FiNAL RE TATEmENT,
supra note 1, at § 212 cmt. d. See also note at 704 (citing authority). For analysis of the all-
affiliates theory, see infra text accompanying notes 124-31.
16. On possible expansion of conflict situations under this theory by operation of the "alter
ego" exception to it recognized by some authorities, see infra text accompanying notes 133, 146 &
198-209.
17. See, e.g., Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d
419 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (lawyer representing one member of corporate family only represents that
member and not others, no matter how closely related, except in case of "alter ego" entities); ABA
Ethics Committee Formal Op. 95-390 (1995) (similar). For analysis of the "alter ego" aspect of the
no-affiliates per se rule, see infra text accompanying notes 198-209.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 132-38.
19. Bass Plc. v. Promus Cos., No. 92 CIV. 0969 (SWK), 1994 U.S. LEXIS 136, (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 10, 1994) (Kram, J.). I served as co-counsel for the successful law firm on the disqualification
motion.
20. Teckni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 674 N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 1996).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 262-68.
1999]
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rule merely states that lawyers are not subject to the no-affiliates rule,
but-other than alluding to an alter ego exception2 2 and one dealing with
confidentiality 2 3-provides no further guidance as to the otherwise
unspecified "exceptions to the general proposition" that it also recog-
nizes. 24 The more recent rule of the District of Columbia is much more
admirably fine-tuned and is examined below, with very general
approval.25 Indeed, the committee now studying the ABA's Model Rules
would do well to follow it, with some alterations, as a model for other
jurisdictions.
In this article, I reconsider this double set of corporate-family con-
flict problems and propound theories and considerations on the basis of
which most such issues might be addressed. I examine the issues both in
terms of conventional conflict-of-interest analysis, and, perhaps of equal
importance, in terms of the practicalities confronted by businesses in set-
ting up and operating affiliated corporations and of law firms in dealing
with conflicts problems created by corporate affiliations. Too often, anal-
ysis of corporate-family conflicts has proceeded by caricaturing affiliated
entities as if they were all mega-corporations with hundreds of affiliates
or by ad hominem suspiciousness about the motivations of corporations
that might object to a law firm's suing an affiliate. While any conflict
theory should recognize the potential for confounding complexity in
applying conflict rules or outright abuse of them, here as elsewhere, the-
ory can hardly be justified on the overriding notion that either grotesque
22. On the possible meanings and difficulties with the "alter ego" exception, see infra text
accompanying notes 198-210.
23. Even commentators otherwise favoring the no-affiliates position concede that a
confidentiality basis for objection should be recognized. See infra text accompanying note 193.
24. Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.13 cmt. (as amended July 23, 1992, effective
January 1, 1993 (605 So.2d 252 (1992)):
REPRESENTING RELATED ORGANIZATIONS
Consistent with the principle expressed in subdivision (a) of this rule, an attorney or
law firm who represents or has represented a corporation (or other organization) ordinarily
is not presumed to also represent, solely by virtue of representing or having represented
the client, an organization (such as a corporate parent or subsidiary) that is affiliated with
the client. There are exceptions to this general proposition, such as, for example, when an
affiliate actually is the alter ego of the organizational client or when the client has revealed
confidential information to an attorney with the reasonable expectation that the
information would not be used adversely to the client's affiliate(s). Absent such an
exception, an attorney or law firm is not ethically precluded from undertaking
representation adverse to affiliates of an existing or former client.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 231 and following. The District of Columbia comments
are reproduced in the Appendix. After completing this paper in substantially its present form,
including its approving words about the District of Columbia rule, I learned at the Hofstra
conference that my sometimes colleague Robert A. O'Malley of the District of Columbia had served
as author of the new D.C. comments.
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caricature is systematically sound or that claims of abuse provide all we
need to know about motivation. Reality may be, on occasion, both
messier 26 and less chaotic2 7 than caricature might suggest.
As will be seen, no single theory can adequately deal with both
lateral and lineal dimensions of corporate-identity conflicts. In the first
place, it must be recognized that lateral and lineal conflicts present
uniquely different problems. Moreover, both kinds of corporate-family
conflicts are best approached in highly individuated ways-ways that,
unfortunately perhaps for large law firms in the present state of conflict-
checking technology, seem to require a correspondingly fact-intensive,
and thus somewhat lawyer-intensive examination of corporate clients and
their affiliates. Such an inquiry, although in part well-adapted to com-
puter-driven conflicts checking for "hits" among prospective present and
former firm clients, will admittedly be more time-intensive and produce
more disabling conflicts than would, for example, the no-affiliates rule
with its refusal to recognize any, or many, such conflicts. But conflicts
analysis is not intended, above all else, to relieve lawyers of the tedious
shopkeeper's 28 work of checking conflicts or, certainly, of the economic
burdens of having to turn away business because the new business will
introduce an impermissible conflict. Nor, more substantially, can con-
flicts law ultimately quail at the thought that an occasional innocent cli-
ent will be forced by conflicts rules to find new counsel and will thus be
denied their first choice of counsel. That is the heavy but accepted price
for conflicts rules in general and should also be recognized as the
accepted price for conflicts within corporate families.
In the remainder of this Article, I begin with illustrations of the
various types of entity families that corporations may create and some of
the reasons they do so. I then briefly examine the entity-representation
rule itself, for it is the starting point from which much corporation-repre-
sentation conflicts analysis proceeds. We see the various ways in which
the entity-representation rule has been applied, both in the law and in the
26. For a survey of the types of affiliated entities and the reasons for proliferating them, see
infra text accompanying notes 29-36.
27. On arguments based on chaos, see infra text accompanying notes 220-27.
28. I refer here, of course, to Holmes' disdainful lament about the busywork of law practice:
"the laborious study of a dry and technical system, the greedy watch for clients and the practice of
shopkeepers' arts, the mannerless conflicts over often sordid interests... "Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., The Profession of Law, Conclusion of a Lecture Delivered to Undergraduates of Harvard
University, on Feb. 17, 1886, reprinted in CoLLEcrED LEGAL PAPERS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR. 29 (New York 1921), cited in Thomas A. Balmer, Holmes on Law as a Business and a
Profession, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591, 592 (1991). If I correctly decipher Holmes' somewhat obscure
syntax, the attribution of greed applies to both the watch for clients and the practice of shopkeepers'
arts.
1999]
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law of lawyering and specifically for purposes of assessing conflicts of
interest in a lawyer's representation of various kinds of entities. It should
be no surprise to find that, even at this preliminary point, the law by no
means favors mindlessly automatic application of the entity-representa-
tion concept. I then turn to examine specifically the problem of lateral-
dimension corporate family conflicts-those of parent-subsidiary corpo-
rations and the like-in the process examining the several theories that
courts and commentators have advanced to resolve corporate-family con-
flict questions. I reject the absolutism of both the all-affiliates and the
no-affiliates positions. In their place, I propose a functional analysis of
such problems-one focusing on protecting the corporate client's reason-
able expectations in the confidentiality of its information and its reason-
able expectations in a smooth working relationship with its counsel based
on the extent of operational proximity between the lawyer's work and the
assertedly affiliated entity and its agents who are important in the repre-
sentation. I then turn in a much more perfunctory way to lineal-dimen-
sion corporate-family conflicts problems. In this quite different realm, I
argue for a test that is again functional but importantly different-one
that focuses upon whether the "before" and "after" family of corpora-
tions represents the same or a different community of interests as com-
pared with those that the lawyer undertook to represent. I also applaud
the nearly universal answer that courts and commentators have given to
another lineal-dimension issue-that concerning conflicts produced by cli-
ent and opposing-party mergers and similar transactions. I then conclude.
II. A TYPOLOGY OF CORPORATE FAMILIES
It has always struck me as one of the marvels of corporate history
that for a time Howard Hughes, the bizarre owner of the mammoth, and
immensely profitable, Hughes Tool Company, ran his business as a sole
proprietorship.29 Only thorough-going eccentrics would do so. There are
simply too many reasons (liability-limitation, tax-avoidance, regulation-
compliance and other legal considerations) that virtually compel busi-
nesses to operate in a more formally structured way. For similar reasons,
businesses often proliferate their corporate forms. An obvious instance is
a business that began small and grew in substantial part through acquisi-
tions of other corporate businesses. Again for tax and other reasons,
including sheer convenience, most such acquisitions take the form of a
29. The tale, as with much else about Howard Hughes, may be apocryphal. At least at the time
of his death, his company was constructed as a so-called "Subchapter C" corporation, a form that
bears resemblance, for all but tax purposes, to a partnership.
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purchase of the stock of the business being acquired, rather than simply
buying the assets of the acquired business (its machinery, intellectual
property and a customer list). The acquired company may itself have
previously acquired companies lower down the corporate-acquisition
feeding chain, with the result that its acquisition brings more than one
additional member to the new corporate family. While such acquisitions
may be followed by merger of the acquired into the acquiring entity,
there may be a host of legal considerations making it at least equally
desirable to leave them formally separate.
Corporate-form growth is particularly common-but by no means
invariable-when the corporate family operates different lines of busi-
ness. Although based on common or related technologies, a company
manufacturing and selling lines of meat grinders, knives, and garden
machines will, for obvious reasons of limiting liability, consider leaving
the various lines of liability-producing business in separate corporations,
or organizing them into such separate entities. Highly diversified busi-
nesses (typical of the acquisitions binge of two and three decades ago)
will often operate through many different corporate entities to reflect the
separate operating reality of the businesses involved. Proliferation of cor-
porate forms is also typical of businesses that, no matter how integrated
in other ways, conduct in part a business that is subject to intense govern-
mental regulation. Thus, it is common in the commercial banking indus-
try for bank-holding companies to own stock in one or more tiers of
either sub-holding companies or bank-operating companies. Speaking
very generally, the operating company is intensely regulated, while the
ownership structure is less constrained and can operate more freely in its
separable business of leveraging and selling participation shares of indi-
rect-ownership interests in the operating entity. The same is true in other
areas of the world of financial services, such as insurance and investment
banking. Joint ventures, common in the construction industry, will often
operate through a separate corporation or other entity that exists only for
the single project contemplated by the venturers. The globalization of
business has played a significant role in the proliferation of corporate
families of large size. In the pharmaceutical industry, a company will
often maintain separate foreign subsidiaries simply to comply with the
various legal (or legal-political) requirements in different countries. If,
for example, a British drug company acquires a French drug company, it
will often leave intact the latter's several foreign-country subsidiaries,
which will be much more efficient than undertaking to obtain clean trans-
fer of the patent rights in the several different countries.
1999]
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Proliferating several corporations within the same business structure
is not cost-free (separate books and records must be kept, separate taxes
must be paid, forms must be filed), but it is hardly cost-intensive. Candid
corporate lawyers will readily concede that setting up corporations is not
the stuff of corporate-law genius. It is routine legal work performed in
most large and small law offices, often by lightly-supervised junior law-
yers using office-wide templates for articles of incorporation and by-
laws. Several large user-friendly corporate-services companies exist to
facilitate the process of paper-work and regulatory compliance (filing
incorporation papers, serving as designated corporate agent). The other
operational requirements to maintain the separate corporate existence of
a non-dormant corporation are minimal. It suffices to hold an annual
meeting of the board (whose members may, of course, double as board
members, officers or employees of an affiliate) and shareholders. Those
meetings can often be conducted on paper only with appropriate
signatures.
The degree to which a separate entity within a multi-corporation
family will be integrated or operated independently varies enormously.
At one extreme are "desk-drawer" corporations-entities that exist only
in the most formal sense. They are wholly-owned and fully-controlled by
a parent whose officers are also the officers of the subsidiary and whose
board members similarly comprise the subsidiary's board. All of its oper-
ations and other functions may be contracted or otherwise delegated to
an affiliate within the corporate family. In the example, above, of a for-
eign-country drug subsidiary, its only purpose and function may be to
hold formal legal title to a foreign patent. At the other extreme, a subsidi-
ary or other affiliate may have as its only link with the parent the fact of
stock ownership. A parent may, for example, own the subsidiary solely
for the purpose of investment. The subsidiary may function with a board
and officers who are different from and in no way are controlled or influ-
enced in policy-making by the board or officers of the parent. There are,
obviously, infinite gradations in between.
There are also endless variations on the degree of ownership linking
the corporate family and on the sheer number of members. One quite
common form of parent-subsidiary relationship is where the subsidiary is
"wholly-owned," with the parent owning 100% of the voting stock of the
subsidiary. Sometimes, however, a percentage of voting stock will be
owned by others-by executives, for example, who received their stock
under executive-compensation arrangements, by business colleagues or
simply by the investing public. For the purposes of the SEC, ownership
or control of more than 50% of the voting stock of another company
HeinOnline -- 2 J. Inst. for Study Legal Ethics 304 1999
CORPORATE-FAMILY CONFLICTS
clearly indicates majority control.3° But one company may control
another through control of a percentage of voting stock that is considera-
bly smaller than 50%, through contractual arrangements (voting trusts or
the like) or through control of board membership.31
With respect to size, two different dimensions should be kept in
mind. First is sheer number: a multi-member corporate family can range
from two corporate entities to any greater number. A quick and relatively
random look through the standard reference work, DUN & BRADSTREET'S
AMERICA'S CORPORATE FAMILIES, indicates several corporations consist-
ing of several hundred corporate affiliates. 32 One set of corporate affili-
ates consists of 1,578 individual entities.33 Second, a proliferation of
corporate affiliates is in no direct way related to measurable wealth or
other success of the enterprise. Major American corporations (variously)
tend to have larger corporate families, but very small enterprises can
have as large or larger numbers of affiliates. The problem of corporate-
family conflicts, in other words, is not limited to the vast sprawling
mega-corporations as sometimes imagined. Certainly, very small enter-
prises can consist of two or more corporate family members.
Beyond sheer number, complexity can also be a function of interre-
lationships between the affiliates within a corporate family. A single
"parent corporation" with a single "subsidiary corporation" is quite typi-
30. In general, a financial statement filed pursuant to the federal securities acts must include
information about "affiliates." Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation S-X (1997).
Definitions in § 210.1-02 of the Commission's regulations define such terms as the following:
"affiliate" (§ 210.1-02(b)) ("a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries,
controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the person specified"); "control"
(§ 210.1-02(g)) ("the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of
the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting shares, by
contract, or otherwise"); "majority-owned subsidiary" (§ 210.1-02(n)) ("a subsidiary more than 50
percent of whose outstanding voting shares is owned by its parent and/or the parent's other majority-
owned subsidiaries"); "parent" (§ 210.1-02(p)) ("an affiliate controlling such person directly, or
indirectly through one or more intermediaries"); "significant subsidiary" (§ 210.1-02(w)) (very
roughly, an interest exceeding 10 percent).
31. See id. at § 210.1-02.
32. 1 DuN & BRADsTREET, AMaRIcA's CoRpoRATE FAima~s 64 et seq. (1996) [hereinafter
DUN & BRADSTREEr] (American Express Company, Incorporated-financial-services company with
503 corporate affiliates listed); Listings included Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation-nation's
largest operators of psychiatric hospitals and other medical services, with 329 corporate affiliates.
See id. at 418 et seq. For purposes of this reference volume, a "subsidiary" is any corporation
"whose controlling interest (over 50%) is held by another company." See id. at vii. Compare SEC
Definitions, infra note 103. According to a local Ithaca bookseller, the two-volume Dun &
Bradstreet publication sells for $490.00 at full retail. Purchasing a third volume covering
international corporations adds $360.00 to the price.
33. See id. at 1148 et seq. (Melville Corporation-diversified consumer-products company,
with 1,578 corporate affiliates listed).
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cal. 34 If the parent has two subsidiaries, they are commonly termed "sis-
ter"" or "brother-sister ' 36 corporations. A member of the family may be
either a corporation or another form of entity, such as a partnership or
joint venture, with the additional partners consisting either of affiliates or
outside interests. While one commonly thinks of corporate families in
rigidly hierarchical form-for example, with a parent controlling its sub-
sidiary, or with sister corporations commonly controlled by a parent-
that arrangement is hardly inevitable. A parent may be a shell organiza-
tion (such as a parent corporation set up only as the acquisition vehicle in
a merger and not yet-or never-dissolved) with no independent manag-
ers or operations, and with the subsidiary's officers setting policy and
giving operational direction to the family. Either contracts or custom
may distort the picture presented by a description of the family traced
only through ownership.
Organizational complexity, however, is not inherently connected
only to the corporate or similar entity forms. When there are no compel-
ling reasons to set up and maintain separate corporations within a corpo-
rate family (or when they are insufficiently appreciated), even an
immense and highly complex business organization can be run within a
single corporation. Instead of conducting different lines of business
through separately incorporated subsidiaries, for many purposes a com-
pany often could just as readily be structured into different "divisions"
that are not separate legal entities. There are no legal rules on what a
division must comprise, under what conditions it must be maintained, or
how it must be operated vis-a-vis the rest of the company. The divisions
can have "presidents" (or vice presidents, or bishops, or whatever) at
their head. The divisions can be operational (widget division, real estate
division) or functional (accounting division, marketing division)-or
simply reflect a more-or-less arbitrary way of dividing up the business,
34. On the parent-subsidiary terminology and its possible range, see, e.g., Camden Iron &
Metal, Inc. v. Marubeni America Corp., 138 F.R.D. 438 (D.N.J. 1991) (differentiating between
parent-subsidiary and sister corporation situations for purposes of determining obligation of
corporate party to obtain documents in possession of affiliated corporation over which it could
exercise "control"); Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc., 738 F.Supp. 193, 200 (S.D. Miss. 1990)
(noting argument of AMR Corporation for purposes of personal jurisdiction that "it is not the parent
of American Airlines, but a sister corporation") (emphasis in original).
35. See, e.g., Camden Iron & Metal, Inc., supra note 34; see also, Shinault, supra note 34.
36. See, e.g., Holland v. High-Tech Collieries, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1021, 1031 (N.D.W.Va.
1996) (using concept of "brother-sister corporations" for purposes of applying regulations under
Coal Act to determine liability for contributions to pension plan); see generally HARRY G. HENN &
JouN R. ALEXANDER, CORPORATONS § 258, at 697 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter HErN & ALEXANDER]
(".... Two or more subsidiaries of a common parent corporation-siblings-are sometimes called
'brother-sister corporations."'). See id.
HeinOnline -- 2 J. Inst. for Study Legal Ethics 306 1999
CORPORATE-FAMILY CONFLICTS
as among the kids or among colleagues who started the business. Divi-
sions can have entirely separate personnel reporting to a central core of
executives, or a highly integrated arrangement of cross-divisional, inter-
locking persons or committees. Whether a business is conducted through
one corporation with five divisions or through a holding company and
five subsidiary corporations is often an accident of corporate history or
an expression of the whim or management style of the manager, commit-
tee or lawyer that served as the chief architect of the corporate family.
Or, to a greater or lesser extent, it could be the unconscious product of a
series of historical accidents and relatively unplanned smaller events.
It is around that messy picture of business enterprises that one must
attempt to frame a workable theory about corporate-family conflicts. But
as a useful further stepping stone to that inquiry, it would be best to
attempt first to understand what or who it is that a lawyer represents
when a lawyer is said to represent a corporation in the situation that is
presumably analytically less complex-when a lawyer represents only a
single corporation that has no affiliates.
Ill. TIHE ENTITY THEORY OF CORPORATE REPRESENTATION
(1) The Entity Theory in General
If the entity theory had not been available to deal with the most
elemental of corporate-conflicts questions when the lawyer codes first
became serious-minded in the late 1960's, 37 it would have been neces-
sary to invent something like it. For purposes of assessing conflicts as
well as many other applications of the law of lawyering to corporate-
client representations, it is essential to have a working notion of who it is
that a lawyer represents when the lawyer provides legal services to a
corporate client. The entity concept first appeared in Ethical Considera-
tion 5-18 of the ABA's 1969 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSI-
BILITY, from which it was carried fairly intact into Rule 1.13(a) of the
ABA's MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. It is important to
note that the rule is quite limited, although all-powerful in its realm. Its
essential message at both places was the same: a lawyer who represents
an organization as client has a client-lawyer relationship with the entity
only, and neither owes client-lawyer duties to any constituent of the
entity nor is to accept instructions from any constituent, except as the
constituent is authorized to speak for the entity in instructing the lawyer.
37. The ABA's CANONS OF ETmcs (1908), which was the immediate predecessor to the
ABA's MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBlI fTY (1969), said nothing about the identity of a
corporate lawyer's client. See MODERN LEGAL Ermcs, supra note 1, § 13.7.2, 732, at note 70.
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But it goes no further. It does not, for example, provide that a lawyer
may represent only the entity, or that the lawyer may never represent a
constituent instead of, or in addition to, the entity when that is the under-
standing of the parties. The rule, importantly, states the identity of the
client once such determinations have been made and it has been con-
cluded that the lawyer represents (only or among others) the corporation
itself.
The entity-representation concept was new in the lawyer codes, but
the entity concept of corporate existence was hardly new in the law.38
Corporations had long since been recognized as entities in many other
areas of the law. In contemporary American corporate law (and, in gen-
eral, Western law)39 it is well-recognized that a corporation can sue or be
sued in its own name,4° can compute its tax liability separately from that
of its owners, 4 1 and can be looked to separately for the purpose of satis-
fying a judgment against it.42 Persons do not by virtue of their roles as
owners and managers of a corporation43 incur liabilities that the law rec-
ognizes to be those of the corporation.' Indeed, that concept of "limited
liability" is undoubtedly the major benefit that the corporate form con-
fers, and concomitantly may be the principal reason why incorporators
and shareholders may prefer this form of ownership and control.
Even within the much narrower realm of the law governing lawyers,
general acceptance of the entity-representation concept by American
courts long predated the first explicit restatement of the entity-represen-
tation rule in the ABA's lawyer codes in 1969 and 1983. 45 Thus, well
38. Here, as in so many other instances in the law regulating lawyers, the lawyer codes
borrowed heavily from surrounding law. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1
cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, April 6, 1998)[hereinafter SECOND PROPOSED RESTATEMENT].
39. See, e.g., PAuL L. DAVIES, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 80-83 (1997)
(United Kingdom law of limited liability for companies and corporations); A.DO FRiGNANi &
GIANcA.IuO EL A, ITALIAN COMPANY LAW 17, 105 (1992) (Italian corporation law limiting liability
for "company limited by shares" (societt per azioni) and limited liability company (societd a
responsibilitd limitata)).
40. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, Fu Da,,srrANAs OF MODERN BusINMss § 13.6.1
(1989)[hereinafter HAMILTON]; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 36, § 352; ABA Model Bus. Corp.
Act § 3.02(1) (1994).
41. See, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 40, § 13.9.1; see also HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note
36, § 76.
42. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 36, § 230, at 37.
43. An officer or other employee who acts for a corporation may become personally liable for
torts committed by, but not for contractual undertakings of, the corporation. HENN & ALEXANDER,
supra note 36, § 73, at 131.
44. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 40, § 13.6.1; See also HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 36,
§ 73.
45. The lawyer codes in most particulars merely formulate for disciplinary application
background rules that were already applicable to lawyers for legal purposes that included, but
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back into the nineteenth century, courts assumed that corporations
enjoyed the benefits of the attorney-client privilege separate and apart
from constituents. 46 Twentieth-century courts have held that same thing
in pre-lawyer code decisions with respect to the more recently recog-
nized work-product immunity.4 7 Courts also uniformly recognized that
extended far beyond, lawyer discipline. See SECOND PROPOSED RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, §1
cmt. b. As Professor Susan P. Koniak has eloquently argued, the lawyer codes have often attempted
to put a "spin" on the formulation of a rule to favor a bar interest. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389 (1992); see also Thomas D. Morgan, The
Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REv. 702 (1977) (lawyer code
formulations rather uniformly favor interests of lawyers). With respect to the question of entity-
representation, the spin is clearly seen in the battle over the shape of ABA Model Rule 1.13(b) on
lawyer whistle-blowing with respect to wrongdoing by corporate insiders. Rule 1.13(a) states that
the entity is the client, suggesting that public disclosure in the interests of the entity would clearly be
permissible, even required by considerations of competent representation of the entity. However, the
rule eventually adopted (rejecting a more permissive rule recommended by the drafting committee)
was much more restrictive, thus protecting the interests of wrong-doing managers. They seem
clearly to have been motivated by a desire to avoid the possibility that a permissive rule would
somehow expose lawyers to liability for failure to make such public disclosures. See ABA Center for
Professional Responsibility, Legislative History of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 90
(1987) (legislative history of Model Rule 1.13(c)); Martin Riger, The Model Rules and Corporate
Practice-New Ethics for a Competitive Era, 17 CONN. L. REV. 729, 739-42 (1985) (describing
lobbying process by which Rule 1.13 was developed); Steven Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the
Wrong Answer to the Question of Corporate Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. J. LEG. ETmIcs 289 (1987)
(similar).
With respect to the narrow question pursued here-the scope of corporate-family representation
for conflicts purposes, the spin is seen in the majority opinion in ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995). See infra text accompanying notes 142-148.
46. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 26 F. 55 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885); see
generally, PROPOSED FINAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 123 cmt. b, note (collecting authorities).
The earliest decision in the Supreme Court was United States v. Louisville & N. R.R., 236 U.S. 318,
336 (1915) (dicta) (attorney-client privilege assumed to apply to corporations). It was not until the
decision in Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), that the Supreme Court held definitively
that a corporation could invoke the privilege. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 6.5.1 (1986). See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471
U.S. 343 (1985) (bankruptcy trustee for corporation controls question of whether or not to assert or
waive attorney-client privilege of corporation, and not officer who made confidential communication
to corporation's lawyer). See generally JomN Wall" GEROACZ, ATroRNY-CoRpoRATE CLIENT
PIvnEGa 1-11 to 1-15 (2d ed. 1990) (history of corporate privilege); David Simon, The Attorney-
Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956). Compare DAVID LUBAN,
CORPORATE CouNsEL AND CoNamaENrTALrry IN ETmcs AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Michael Davis
& Frederick A. Elliston eds., 1986) (criticizing policy basis for extension of privilege to corporate
clients).
47. The assumption that the work-product immunity applies to corporate clients has been
accepted as a matter of course and predominantly without explicit mention. Cf. Jom WILLIAM
GERGACZ, ATroRNEY-CoRPoRATE CLIENT PiuvtuEGE 7-1 (2d ed. 1990) ("... Unlike the attorney-
client privilege, few work product issues directly concern the corporate client .... "). The decision
that has defined and still influences the work-product immunity doctrine in the United States,
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), was itself an attempt to obtain work-product information
about a corporate client. See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449, 383, 397-400 (1981) (similar
assumption that work-product immunity applies to corporate client).
1999]
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corporations and lawyers could form client-lawyer relationships, thus
providing the corporation with the necessary status as "client" to enable
it to sue its lawyer for legal malpractice in its own right48 and otherwise
to invoke the rights of clienthood.49
No sustainable theory has been able to challenge the supremacy of
the entity-representation concept. Possibilities have been bruted about,5 °
such as the notion that the client is the person who "controls" the corpo-
rate matter on which the lawyer's advice or other services are sought."
Such a theory would, to be sure, correspond more closely to the "ordi-
nary" situation of client-lawyer relationships involving human persons
and thus to the interpersonal realities of many corporate-client represen-
tations. But such a theory would suffer from a high degree of indetermi-
nacy because the representation may be guided by a group of persons in
the entity (rather than, as the theory more conveniently would imagine,
by one person) or the identity of the "client" person may shift from one
aspect of related legal services to another in the relatively common
instance of a corporation with more than one person who directs the rep-
resentation of outside counsel. Such a theory would also be disconnected
48. See, e.g., Rosebud Mining & Milling Co. v. Hughes, 64 Pac. 247 (Colo. Ct. Apps. 1901)
(trial court improperly granted demurrer to corporation's allegation that lawyer negligently failed to
perfect appeal that company had hired lawyer to handle); Humboldt Bldg. Ass'n v. Ducker, 64 S.W.
671 (Ky. Ct. Apps. 1901) (building corporation that hired lawyer to examine titles to property stated
cause of action for negligence in examining title in failing to search for liens when lawyer knew that
new construction was occurring on property).
49. Thus, it has long been recognized in judicial decisions that a corporation as client can
object to a lawyer's representation of a client with conflicting interests. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v.
Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978) (frequently-cited case prohibiting unrelated litigation against
existing client and defining what constitutes end of representation); T. C. Theatres, Inc. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (decision that gave name to the "substantial
relationship" rule in former-client conflicts); Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co.,
93 F. 197, 199-200 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899) (assuming application of former-client prohibition to
lawyer for former corporate client, but finding rule not violated here); National Hollow Brake Beam
Co. v. Bakewell, 123 S.W. 561, 567 (Mo. 1909) (corporate client can object to lawyer's
representation of client with conflicting interests in same litigation).
50. See generally MODERN LEGAL ETmcs, supra note 1, § 13.7.2 (reviewing competing
theories). One possible theory is that the lawyer's client is the corporation's board of directors. John
C. Taylor II, The Role of Corporate Counsel, 32 RuroERs L. REV. 237, 241 (1979), critiqued in
MODERN LEGAL ETmcs, supra note 1, at 732 note 70. During the debates that led to adoption of the
ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983, the American College of Trial Lawyers urged
that a lawyer for a corporation should be recognized to represent the entity as well as its directors,
employees and shareholders. See ABA House Comm. on Drafting, Synopsis of Amendments to
Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct 42 (Dec. 30, 1982). Thankfully, the proposal did not
prevail.
51. L. RAY PAr-ERsoN, LEGAL ETHics: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 411 (2d
ed. 1984). In an April 1998 telephone conversation, Professor Patterson informed me that this
reference is a remnant of a paper that he circulated to me (and doubtless others) in draft form in the
early 1980's making the argument referred to in the text.
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from the surrounding law of corporations, adding to its potential for
maundering in application. In any event, the code-drafters, code-adopt-
ers, and courts have spoken. The entity-representation concept reigns
supreme.
(2) Limited Reach of the Entity Theory
Despite its dominance, it is important to note that the entity-repre-
sentation theory has a limited field of operation. It cannot and does not
answer all possible questions about corporate clienthood that have arisen
in the law of lawyering. There should also be no pretense that the entity
theory is uniformly applied to disparate legal questions. Instead, there are
ample indications that courts treat entity-constituent questions quite dif-
ferently when dealing with importantly different issues. A prominent
example concerns the question whether a constituent of an entity client
(such as a corporate family member or an officer or director) may invoke
the corporation's attorney-client privilege. In discussing whether a con-
stituent who reasonably believed that the communication was within a
personal client-lawyer relationship, courts have held that the entity-con-
stituent differentiation for this purpose is to be drawn more sharply (and
thus less favorably to the individual constituent) than would be the case
were the question one of conflicts of interest.52
Another example of differential treatment under the entity concept
involves application of the so-called anti-contact rule.53 Under that rule a
lawyer acting on behalf of a client is prohibited from contacting a person
whom, as the lawyer knows, is currently represented by another law-
yer.54 The anti-contact rule presents an inevitable question about the
identity of such a prohibited person (or persons) when an opposing law-
yer represents a corporation or similar entity. If the entity-representation
concept had been held to apply in the case of corporations, the anti-con-
tact rule would be vacuous, since under it the opposing lawyer would be
held to represent no person at all. In that view, the inquiring lawyer
whose client opposed the corporation could talk to any and all of its
officers and employees. The law, of course, is to the contrary. A com-
ment to the ABA's Model Rule 4.2 attempts to trace out the set of pres-
52. A prominent recent example is United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
119 F.3d 210, 216-17 (2d Cir. 1997) (while reasonable belief in existence of personal client-lawyer
relationship may preclude subsequent adverse representation on conflicts grounds, that belief does
not create a personal claim in constituent to assert attomey-client privilege after entity has waived
privilege).
53. Another equally prominent example is the very different, and limited, way that the entity-
representation rule applies to class action representations. See infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
54. See MODEL RuLEs 4.2; MODEL CODE DR 7-104(A).
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ent officers and employees of an entity client who qualify as persons not
to be contacted." Whether successful or not as an intelligible regulation
(the rule has proven quite difficult to apply in several areas), the rule as
written and as applied clearly and properly is different and divorced from
the entity-representation concept.5
6
(3) What Counts as an "Entity" for Conflicts Purposes?-Beyond
the Corporate Form
While the entity theory has gained wide acceptance with respect to
conflicts questions involving corporations, it is by no means so univer-
sally agreed upon whether and how it applies to putative entities other
than the paradigm corporation. Even with respect to the corporate form
itself, the theory has become attenuated in the case of the corporate form
in which most corporations in fact exist-the close corporation.57 Rules
such as ABA Model Rule 1.13(a) obviously assume an organization of
some size, significantly complex structure, relatively permanent form,58
and, in general, some external set of features permitting the "thing" to be
identified as something other than a loose aggregation of individuals. In
other words, the group must have collective interests of a legal nature for
whose collective benefit retaining a lawyer makes practical sense. A
group of two people walking down a street or a mob surging through a
town, for example, is presumably not an entity. 59 But, of course, it is
55. See ABA Model Rule 4.2 cmt. (4).
56. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GovERImt o LAWYERS §159 cmt. (b), (Tentative Draft No.
8, 1997) (tentatively approved, 1997) (reviewing debate about proper application of anti-contact rule
to corporate clients). See also MODEL RuLE 4.2 cmt. (4); Model Rule 4.2 [4] § 159 cmt. (b),
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997) (tentatively approved, 1997) (reviewing debate about proper
application of anti-contact rule to corporate clients).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 68-79. On the ubiquity of the close corporation, see,
e.g., ROBERT W. HAMLTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BusiNsS § 14.6, at 534 (1989) (citing
various studies of sizes of corporations (in number of shareholders and assets) and concluding that
"closely held corporations were by far the most numerous"); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R.
ALEXANDER, CORPORATIONS § 257, at 694, note 1 (3d ed. 1983) (citing U.S. Commerce Department
statistics showing numerical dominance of close corporations among corporate entities in existence).
58. Compare PRoPosED FniAL RESTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 212 cmt. (a):
[A]n organization includes a corporation (whether for-profit or not-for-profit), limited or
general partnership (whether formal or informal), labor union, unincorporated association,
joint venture, trust, estate, or similar entity with a recognizable form, internal organization,
and relative permanence. Many organizations are recognized as entities for other legal
purposes, but such recognition is not invariably required for the purposes of this Section
An illustration later in the same section of the Restatement uses as an example a private investment
club of individuals who have pooled their individual assets to invest. See id. at cmt. F, illus. 5.
59. For purists, I should clarify that even a mob may have legal significance as a collective.
For example, a preexisting plan among its members to violate the law might implicate them in a
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probably preposterous to think of such a transitory group (as distinct
from more permanent gangs6') acting collectively to retain a lawyer.61
Nonetheless, when pushed very hard, it appears that the entity-represen-
tation concept is quite plastic and could acceptably include any aggrega-
tion of people who, with their chosen lawyer, reach an understanding that
the lawyer is to represent the collective as such rather than, or in addition
to, its constituent elements. Conversely, a multiplicity of constituents is
not a prerequisite to entity representation. If a single individual acts in
the legally prescribed way in establishing and operating an entity such as
a corporation and a lawyer undertakes to represent the entity, it will
clearly qualify as an entity for conflicts and other representational pur-
poses notwithstanding the involvement of only one person in its creation,
ownership and management.
Part of the explanation for the wide variability of the entity-repre-
sentation concept flows from the fact that it is contractual in origin and
scope. The concept recognizes that the client-lawyer relationship is one
that, for the most part, willing putative clients and lawyers are free to
shape as they wish.62 For that reason, entity clients could include non-
criminal conspiracy. See generally Model Penal Code § 5.03 (1985). See also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE
& AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMNAL LAW § 6.5(g), at 112 (1986) (discussing
"plurality" requirement of conspiracy law, under which prosecution must prove combination of two
or more persons).
60. See, e.g., FRANK RAGANO & SELWYN RAAB, MoB LAWYER (1994) (purported life story of
self-styled lawyer for mobsters in Florida and nationally, with purported sensational revelations
about who killed Jimmy Hoffa and President Kennedy); THE GoTrn TAPES (1992) (transcripts of
government's secretly tape-recorded conversations involving John Gotti, then reputed head of
criminal "family," replete with references to work by lawyers for family, including one murderous
expression of client dissatisfaction (id. at 111)). On occasion a purported lawyer for a criminal
family can be accused of conflicts of interest generically similar to those of a more mainstream
corporate-family lawyer. See William Glaberson, Prosecutors Dusting Off Old Tactic Against Gotti,
N.Y. TumAs, Mar. 28, 1998, at 3, col. 5 (press account of letters sent by federal prosecutors to two
lawyers representing alleged head of crime family in criminal prosecution, suggesting that lawyers
had conflicts of interest because of their ties to family).
61. On the other hand, at least one decision-perhaps fancifully-permitted a class action
brought on behalf of an ill-defined group of student demonstrators to obtain a temporary restraining
order against allegedly unconstitutional police practices in attempting to break up ongoing
demonstrations against the resumption of U.S. bombing in Cambodia. The decision, by federal
district judge Earl Larson in the District of Minnesota, was unreported. Under accepted concepts of
class-action representation, see infra text accompanying notes 96-98, the lawyer in the case
presumably represented all of the demonstrators, at least for purposes of the anti-contact rule.
62. See PRoPosED FINAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 26 cmt. (f) ("... Whether the lawyer
is to represent the organization, a person or entity associated with it, or more than one such persons
and entities is a question of fact to be determined based on reasonable expectations in the
circumstances ...."). Where the parties have clearly expressed that intent, multiple representation
may even consist of clients with conflicting interests. Of course, the permissibility of a lawyer
entering into such a relationship is an independent matter. Moreover, as the cited comment in the
RESTATEMENT goes on to state, when the claimed client-lawyer relationship is not express but
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entity entities, or, put differently, aggregations of constituents of a more-
commonly recognized entity or others created ad hoc. A recurring illus-
tration of that type is the group consisting of the non-insider members of
the board of directors of a corporation. In recent years, that group-
although it has little other independent legal significance-has come to
exercise extraordinary supervisory powers with respect to certain mat-
ters, for example to determine whether the company should support liti-
gation claiming that insider members of the board acted wrongfully as
charged in a shareholder derivative action.63 In performing that function,
the group obviously will require a lawyer's assistance. But, it would
hardly be optimal for the lawyer to be selected through the corporation's
normal procedures, which likely are subject to influence by those
charged in the lawsuit. For similar reasons, the group's lawyer should
usually avoid conflicting representations and represent only the group
and not, for example, attempt to represent additional clients such as
insider directors with respect to the same matter.' While one could cer-
tainly view the lawyer as representing each individual member as a co-
client of all the others, it is also possible for the lawyer to arrange to
assertedly is evidenced by the implicit understanding of the parties, ".. . due consideration should be
given to the unreasonableness of a claimed expectation of entering into a co-client status when a
significant and readily apparent conflict of interest exists between the organization or other client
and the associated person or entity claimed to be a co-client .... Id.
63. See, e.g., In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 750 F. Supp. 641, 646-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing authority); see generally ALl Principles of Corporate Governance § 1.15
(1994)[hereinafter ALl Principles] (definition of "disinterested directors"). See id. at § 7.10(a)(1)
(power of independent directors to direct dismissal of derivative action alleging violation of duty of
care). See id. at § 7.10(a)(2) (same, with respect to allegations of violation of duty of fair dealing).
See also HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 57, § 367 (describing legal effect of litigation committee
consisting entirely of independent directors independently advised).
On powers of disinterested directors beyond dealing with derivative actions, see e.g., ALI
Principles, supra § 5.02(a)(2)(B) & (C) (advance authorization of independent directors ratifying
certain transactions between corporation and director or senior executive). See also § 5.03(a)(2)
(advance authorization of amount of compensation to director or senior executive); § 5.05(a)(3)(B)
(advance authorization of director or senior executive taking advantage of corporate opportunity);
§ 5.15(b)(3) (advance authorization of transfer in control of corporation in which director or
principal senior executive of corporation is interested).
64. See, e.g., In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Derivative Litigation, supra note 63, at 647
(lawyers to independent directors had conflict of interest rendering them not the required
"independent counsel" where directors retained same lawyers who were already representing
company and its board in derivative action); Cf In re Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litigation,
132 F.R.D. 455, 476-79 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (lawyer retained by special committee, although same
lawyer defending company in pending derivative action, did not lack independence because
committee proceeded on assumption that case had merit and that only question was whether
maintenance of suit would be inconsistent with other litigation in which company had substantial
stake; while law firm representing individual directors could not properly represent committee in its
deliberations, committee and its counsel could permissibly consult with those lawyers, including
about merits of derivative claims).
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represent the collective interests of the group as a whole and not any of
its members individually. Among other things, that arrangement would
guard against the possibility that one or more apparently disinterested
members of the group themselves were complicit in the charged acts.
Should that possibility arise, individual representation could, in the
absence of consent, require that a new lawyer be appointed to begin the
investigative process anew. A second example of a non-entity entity
would be a division of a corporation that has no separate legally-recog-
nized existence-which, in other words, has not been separately incorpo-
rated as a subsidiary or other affiliated corporation. While it is hardly
customary to do so, a lawyer and corporate client might expressly agree65
or circumstances might sufficiently indicate that the lawyer's undertak-
ing extended only to the legal interests of the division and not to the
corporation as a whole.66 If that is done, the lawyer would presumably
remain free to represent another client in a matter in which the corpora-
tion's interests (but not those of the division) were adverse.
(4) The Proliferation of Entity Forms
While not purporting to do so exhaustively, it may be useful to
examine somewhat more closely several additional applications of the
entity-representation theory that are less than obvious. The exercise will
prove useful in later analysis67 in which several such applications may
aid understanding of larger issues. It will also provide an opportunity to
assess the ways in which voluntary acts of a lawyer may transform what
starts out as an entity representation into much more. That transformative
question will be pursued primarily in connection with one of its common
areas of application: the close corporation.
65. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390, at 2
(1995)(for a discussion of the permissibility of such an agreement). See also PROPOSEo FnAL
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 202 cmt. (d) & note thereto (for a general discussion on the question
of advance consent).
66. Cf. Nichols v. United Exposition Serv. Co., 902 F. Supp. 32, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (when
division of corporation was covered by insurance policy issued by carrier different from company
insuring corporation's liability, second lawyer, representing division only, would be permitted to
participate in certain non-jury aspects of litigation). Distinguishable is the situation in Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980), in which the court held that a law firm
would not be permitted to represent a division of a corporation due to what the court termed a
conflict between the corporation and its "drives division." See MODERN LEGAL ETmcs, supra note 1,
§ 8.3.2, at 4.2.1, note 56. The court's analysis was hardly based on conventional conflicts analysis,
but was more obviously based on the potentially transitory status of the division.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 228 and following.
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(a) Close Corporations 68
Application of the entity-representation concept to a close corpora-
tion-a corporation in which ownership and management are largely
coextensive 69-has not been handled entirely satisfactorily in the deci-
sions. Perhaps employing the notion that a close corporation is merely an
"incorporated partnership,"7 some courts have intimated that a lawyer
who represents a close corporation also ineluctably represents principals
of it.71 But to treat a close corporation as the legal equivalent of a part-
68. In a provocative article, Professor Lawrence E. Mitchell has proposed a new ethics rule of
extremely fine detail, based in part on a sub-typology of close corporations. Lawrence E. Mitchell,
Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation: Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNEL. L.
REv. 466 (1989). The analysis neglects consideration of consent issues. In Bryan J. Pechersky, Note,
Representing General Partnerships and Close Corporations: A Situational Analysis of Professional
Responsibility, 73 TExAs L. REv. 919 (1995), the student author proposes that a lawyer should be
held to represent all principal constituents of a partnership or close corporation unless the lawyer
obtains the informed consent of each client prior to acting on their behalf.
More likely than any such all-inclusive resolution, the problem will continue to be analyzed
under more general rules, with more focused and particularized attention to types of legal
representations, types of corporate arrangements for control, and the prior relationships between the
lawyer and the various constituents of the organization. See generally PROPOSED FINAL
REsTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 212, cmt. e, at 698-99 (where owner-manager of close corporation,
small partnership or similar entity takes position that interests of all controlling persons and entity
should be treated as if the same lawyer acts reasonably in accepting such direction in good faith). As
with so many other issues in this Article, the wisest course will almost always involve a lawyer
anticipating the need to confront such issues early in the representation and reaching an explicit
understanding with the client. See infra text accompanying notes 213-19, 271-73.
69. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FuNDAMENTALs OF MODERN Bustrss, supra note 57, at
§ 14.4.1, at 529; HENN & ALExANDER, supra note 36, at § 257, at 694 (3d ed. 1983); F. HODGE
O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 1 O'NEAL's CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02 (3d ed. 1992). A
common illustration is the mom-and-pop store run by the spouses who (sometimes, for tax or
succession reasons, together with additional family members) own all the voting shares and are the
only officers of the corporate business. See, e.g., In re Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655 (Or. 1979) (father
and son each owned 35% of drapery business with capitalization of $15,000, while friend owned
remaining 30%). Somewhat more upscale may be the two-physician medical practice, with the
doctors and their spouses again filling all officer positions and owning all of the stock.
70. Cf. Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (facts demonstrated that
both equal-interest shareholders in close corporation treated it "as if it were a partnership rather than
a corporation"); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (noting the
"fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the partnership"); Crosby v. Beam, 548
N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989) ("Close corporations bear a striking resemblance to a partnership.").
71. See supra note 10. See also Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
("[W]here, as here, the corporation is a close corporation consisting of only two shareholders with
equal interests in the corporation, it is indeed reasonable for each shareholder to believe that the
corporate counsel is in effect his own individual attorney."); Woods v. Superior Court, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 185, 189 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("We conclude that, absent consent or waiver, the attorney
of a family-owned business, corporate or otherwise, should not represent one owner against the other
in a [marriage] dissolution action."); In re Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655, 657 (Or. 1979) (". . . In
actuality, the attorney in such a situation represents the corporate owners in their individual
capacities as well as the corporation unless other arrangements are clearly made .. "); In re Banks,
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nership for this purpose hardly displaces the entity theory. As will be
seen, 72 partnerships of all sorts are now routinely regarded as entities
under that theory.
A preferable analysis is to view the situation of representation of a
close corporation as a particular instance for application of another gen-
eral theory-one that acknowledges the role of the entity theory, but that
also will hold a lawyer to a personal client-lawyer relationship with
entity constituents when the circumstances sufficiently indicate that the
lawyer undertook to represent the constituent as an individual. 73 That
general theory will find a client-lawyer relationship as the result of either
an express or implied undertaking. A lawyer enters an express client-
lawyer relationship with a constituent when the lawyer and the constitu-
ent explicitly agree to do so.7 4 An implied client-lawyer relationship
comes about when lawyer and client omit to express their agreement in
explicit terms, but where the circumstances sufficiently indicate that they
have proceeded on that understanding.75 The relationship may also be
created by estoppel, occurring in instances of detrimental reliance in
which the client manifests intent that the lawyer provide legal services
and the lawyer, reasonably aware that the putative client relies on the
lawyer, fails to manifest lack of consent to perform the service.76 A rela-
tionship of client and lawyer formed in any of those ways imposes on the
lawyer the duties of avoiding conflicting representations.77
Under those theories, one cannot categorically state that a lawyer
representing a close corporation does or does not also represent one or
584 P.2d 284, 290 (Or. 1978) (where "closely held family corporation... is substantially controlled
and operated by one person and where the corporation's attorneys have been that person's personal
attorneys as well... [i]n such a situation ... common sense dictates that the corporate entity should
be ignored.").
72. See infra notes 83-84.
73. See generally PROPOSED FINAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 212 cmt. (e), at 696
(reference to general rules on formation of client-lawyer relationship with respect to question
whether lawyer for entity also has client-lawyer relationship with constituent).
74. See generally PROPOSED FiNAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 26 cmts. (c) & (e).
75. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 580 F.2d 1311, 1319-20 (7t Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); International Tele-Marine Corp. v. Malone & Assocs., Inc., 845 F.
Supp. 1427, 1433 (D. Colo. 1994); In re Berkowitz, 642 A.2d 389, 395 (N.J. 1994). See generally
PROPOSED FiNAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 26(1)(a) and cmts. (c) & (e).
76. See generally PROPOSED FinAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 26(l)(b) & cmt. (e), at 7-9.
The principle at work here, of course, is the familiar notion of promissory estoppel. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). See also PROPOSED FiNAL RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, at 7 and § 26 cmt. (e)(citing authorities).
77. Further questions may arise, such as whether the entity client and constituent are co-clients
in the representation or, differently, whether the lawyer represents separate clients in separate
matters. See PROPOSED FINAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 112 cmt. (I). Resolution of such
follow-on issues are not critical for purposes of this Article.
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more principals in the entity until the facts in the particular case are more
closely examined. Many judicial decisions announcing that a lawyer cat-
egorically represents particular constituents of a close corporation pro-
vide sufficient background facts from which it can be seen that the court
might have reached the same finding of a client-lawyer relationship on
the above analysis, particularly on that part of it involving an implied
relationship of client-lawyer with the constituent.78 In other words, those
decisions may simply reflect the reality that-unlike the situation in
large corporations in which a client-lawyer relationship with a constitu-
ent will be the exception-a constituent in a close corporation who has
extensive and personal dealings with the entity's lawyer will often mani-
fest to the lawyer an understanding that the lawyer represents the constit-
uent with respect to the constituent's personal interests in addition to
representing the entity. On the other hand, if the constituent in the close
corporation and the lawyer sufficiently indicate that the lawyer is to rep-
resent only the entity, and not the constituent individually, there seems
no sound reason for refusing to give effect to their mutual understanding,
and some decision to proceed on that view.79
(b) Partnerships, Membership Associations, Joint Ventures and
Syndicates, Estates, and Trust
The entity-representation concept clearly extends to more than the
corporate form.80 The wording of the lawyer codes provisions itself indi-
78. See, e.g. Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (on facts,
reasonable for both shareholders in close corporation to believe lawyer represented both); In re
Banks, 584 P.2d 284, 290-91 (Or. 1978) (while broadly suggesting categorical close-corporation rule
that entity is to be ignored, facts of case strongly suggest that legal services were rendered to and for
benefit of individual who was dominant owner-manager).
79. See, e.g., Bobbit v. Victorian House, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(representing a close corporation "does not inherently mean also acting as counsel to the individual
director-shareholders. Rather the question must be determined on the individual facts of each case.")
(footnote omitted); Wayland v. Shore Lobster & Shrimp Co., 537 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (rejecting per se rule that law firm representing close corporation thereby represents all
shareholders personally). Cf In re Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655, 657 (Or. 1979) (dicta) ("clear
understanding with corporate owners that the attorney represents solely the corporation and not their
individual interests" would make it proper for lawyer to represent interests of third party adverse to
those of shareholder).
80. The commentators agree. See, e.g., HAzARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.13:103, at 390
(2d ed. 1990); UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, TRIAL ETmcs § 3.4.1, at 81 (2d ed. 1988); MODERN LEGAL
ETmcs, supra note 1, at § 8.3.5, at 427. See generally PROPOSED FINAL RESTATEMENT, supra note
1, § 212 cmt. (a). The reference to corporations naturally extends to all such forms-whether for-
profit or not and no matter how large or (with an important qualification for entities such as the close
corporation) no matter how small. See id.
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cates as much.8" The Restatement would extend the concept to most
imaginable entities.82 The cases largely agree. Lawyers have been found
to have entered into client-lawyer relationships with the following enti-
ties: general partnerships,83 limited partnerships,84 membership associa-
8 86tions such as labor unions and trade associations," 5 joint ventures,
81. The text of ABA Model Rule 1.13 is rather elliptical about the point, but its intended
breadth is sufficiently clear from its calculated reference to an "organization" (rather than a
"corporation") as client in the rule itself and its explicit (but non-exhaustive) references to
unincorporated associations. See MODEL RutEs, supra note 1, at cmts. [1], [10] and[6]. Rules
1.13(d) and (e), in listing constituents of an organizational client, mention "members," a term
inapposite to corporations, but relevant to a union or other unincorporated association. See MODEL
RuLEs, supra note 1, at 1.13.
82. See generally text accompanying note 58. See also supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
83. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361
at 2-3 (1991) (citing authority). See also Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
756, 758 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (stating in the case of first impression in California, "We hold
here that an attorney representing a [general] partnership does not necessarily have an attorney-client
relationship with an individual partner for purposes of applying the conflict of interest rules.
Whether such a relationship exists turns on finding an agreement, express or implied, that the
attorney also represents the partner."). As has been usefully pointed out, general partners bear
personal financial responsibility for obligations of the partnership, and it may thus be appropriate to
regard ambiguous situations of a lawyer providing services with respect to such obligations and
interacting personally with the partners as instances of a direct client-lawyer relationship with the
individual partners. See Pechersky, supra note 68. Properly understood, such an analysis would
simply apply the concept of implied client-lawyer relationship alluded to above. See supra text
accompanying notes 73-77.
84. See Kline Hotel Partners v. Aircoa Equity Interests, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 (D.
Colo. 1989) (for purposes of former-client conflict allegation, lawyer who formerly represented
partnership that built and operated hotel did not represent general partner who owned 50% interest);
Buehler v. Sbardellati, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (where lawyer for two clients
forming limited partnership to own and operate out-of-state apartment complex that firm would
represent only partnership and not partners, no client-lawyer relationship necessary for later legal
malpractice suit by partner); Rose v. Summers, Compton, Wells & Hamburg, P.C., 887 S.W.2d 683
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (no client-lawyer relationship necessary for maintenance of legal malpractice
action existed between law firm representing limited partnership and limited partners) (citing
authority).
85. See Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mutual, 900 F.2d 882, 889 (60" Cir. 1990) (on
facts presented, lawyer who had formerly represented national organization of medical
administrative services providers did not represent individual regional members of organization);
Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979) (in circumstances presented, lawyer for
teachers' membership association could represent male physical education teachers in lawsuit that
female teachers opposed); Ocean Club of Palm Beach Shores Condominium Assoc. v. Daly, 504 So.
2d 1377, 1379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) ("[Law firm's] representation of Ocean Club, the
condominium association for all of the unit owners, is not impaired by the fact that the association is
involved in litigation against one of its members. Were it otherwise, a condominium association
could retain counsel in such litigation. In representing the association, counsel represents the
corporate entity, not the individual unit owners. Thus, there is no conflict of interest to contend
with."). See also Schuler v. Meschke, 435 N.W.2d 156, 162 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (members of
farm cooperative could not sue for malpractice lawyers who represented only cooperative as entity);
See generally ABA Formal Opin. 92-365 (1992) (conflicts issues in representing trade association to
be resolved through application of entity-representation rule). Cf Flamma v. Atlantic City Fire
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business trusts,87 trusts,88 and estates of decedents. s9 In fact, one who for
some reason favored a narrow reading of Model Rule 1.13(a) must be
alarmed on consulting the decisions, for there are few decisions holding
that most particular forms of entities are categorically incapable of bear-
ing that description.9"
(c) Exotic Entities-Class Clients
The hopes of those who seek certainty in the law-in the sense of a
broad rule uniformly applied across a large number of arguably similar
instances-are often frustrated. So is it with the entity-representation
concept. While most organizations are treated in a rather straightforward
Dep't, 555 A.2d 697 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (in view of quasi-official status of public-
employees' union, law firm for union could not defend union member in union-disciplinary
proceeding while other firm lawyers represented union in unrelated matters).
A special situation is presented when, by reason of her work representing an association, the
lawyer learns confidential information from association members, who have imparted the
information in the reasonable belief that it would not be used adversely to their interests and where
such imparted information could be relevant in the subsequent adverse representation. See Glueck v.
Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981) (under "substantial relationship" concept, law
firm for trade association disqualified from suing association member); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1318-20 (7' Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 955 (1978) (similar).
86. See Kahn v. Wien, CIV No. 86-2416 (RJD), 1989 WL 65449, at *4-*5 (E.D.N.Y., June 6,
1989) (in absence of allegation that personal client-lawyer relationship existed between joint venture
member and law firm representing joint venture, fact that firm was general counsel to joint venture
provides no basis for member's motion to disqualify firm from representing venture in litigation
against member); Erbach Fin. Corp. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 610 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (where lawyer represented "syndicate" and not members, former-client conflict rule did not
bar subsequent representation against member); Cf AI-Yusr Townsend & Bottum Co. v. United
Mid East Co., Civ. A. No. 95-1168, 1995 WL 592548, at *3 (E.D. Pa., Oct. 4, 1995) (in view of
nature of joint venture, direct client-lawyer relationship exists between lawyer representing joint
venture and each member of venture).
87. Granite Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. Atlantic City, 624 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div.; April 5, 1993) (because law firm representing unincorporated business trust represented only
entity, lawyer may represent opponent of individual member of trust).
88. I here whistle past a large graveyard of contrary decisions. See Jeffrey N. Pennell,
Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who Is the Client?, 62 FoRDAm L. REv. 1319
(1994)(for a proficient discussion of contrary decisions).
89. See In re Estate of Nuyen, 443 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill App. Ct. 1982) (beneficiary of estate not
entitled to complete file of lawyer for estate for lack of client-lawyer relationship). Cf. People v.
Gebauer, 821 P.2d 782, 784 (Colo. 1991) (discipline for representing two estates after conflicts
developed among beneficiaries of them); In re Jenkins, 438 S.E.2d 226 (S.C. 1993) (discipline for,
among other things, representing both estate and personal representative with conflicting interests).
Cf. Pennell, id. at 1321-26 (discussing decisions taking various positions on identification of client
in representation of a decedent's estate).
90. To be sure, decisions can be found refusing to find that a particular entity was in fact being
represented by the lawyer in question. But few of those decisions hold that, on different facts, the
court would refuse to find that the entity in question was incapable of being represented separate
from its constituents. The decisions refusing to accord entity status are found most commonly in the
trust and estates area. See Pennell, supra note 88.
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way under the rule, there are exceptions. One will be noted here-a class
in a class action, which, chameleon-like, is treated by courts as either an
entity or an aggregation of individual clients depending on the precise
question being asked.
A class in a modem class action is an apparently unique entity
that-at the same time, but for different legal purposes-will be regarded
as both extraordinarily unified and extraordinarily disparate. For pur-
poses of internal conflicts of interest between members of the class with
respect to accepting or rejecting a settlement, courts very generally treat
the class as an entity, but one with quite different client-lawyer features.
Recognizing a power otherwise unheard of in client-lawyer relation-
ships,9 ' certainly including other entity-representation situations, courts
in class actions have uniformly held that a lawyer for a class may refuse
to follow the wishes of class members with respect to settlement offers,92
and indeed may refuse to follow the unequivocal instructions of the very
person who presumably empowered the lawyer to act in the matter in the
first instance, the class representative.93 But at the same time a class also
possesses other quite weak incidents of entity status. For example, while
the normal rule is that the anti-contact rule (prohibiting a lawyer from
contacting a person represented by another lawyer) only applies to a nar-
row circle of persons associated with an entity client,94 the rule generally
recognized for a class is that each member of a certified class is within
the anti-contact prohibition, in effect each being treated as if he or she
were an individual client of the lawyer.95
91. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 1, at 1.2(a) ("... . A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. ... ); See generally PROPOSED FINAL
RESTATEEENT, supra note 1, § 33(1) & cmt. (c).
92. See generally PRoPosED FtNAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 26 cmt. (f).
93. See Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1210-11 (5" Cir. 1982) (because duty owed by
class counsel is owed to entire class and not to named representative clients, class lawyer acted
properly in reaching settlement in which ten of eleven named representatives objected for personal
reasons); Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 508 (5' Cir. 1981) (due to unique
character of class action, lawyer for class can settle class action without authority of client who is
class representative). See also Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d
Cir. 1995) (class lawyers have obligation to all class members and must not allow decisions on
behalf of class to rest entirely with named representatives). The extraordinary powers of a class
action lawyer have hardly gone without challenge. For a powerful theoretical critique of the class-
action institution under theories of democracy, see William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate:
Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE
L.J. 1623 (1994).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
95. See Blanchard v. Edgemark Fin. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 293, 300-301 (N.D. Il. 1997);
HERBERT B. NEwBERG, 3 NEWBERG ON CLAss ACnONS § 15.18, at 15-49 (3d ed. 1992).
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(5) Client-Lawyer Relationships with "Constituents "-Expanding the
Client Base Beyond the Entity
The discussion of close corporations 96 sufficiently indicates that,
although the entity concept of corporate representation is now univer-
sally accepted, that hardly means that in each instance in which a lawyer
represents an entity such as a corporation the lawyer will be held to rep-
resent only the entity.97 That is an appropriate reading of both the lawyer
codes and most of the decisions interpreting them.98 Expansion of the
lawyer's conflict base occurs because the lawyer conducts herself in such
a way that one or more constituents or affiliates reasonably rely on the
lawyer to protect their individual legal interests as well. As a result, a
relationship of client and lawyer with the affiliate (or something func-
tionally equivalent for conflicts purposes) can be created. Thus, the entity
rule positing that the lawyer represents Corporation A-and not its affili-
ates-does not preclude a finding that the lawyer, in the circumstances,
so conducted herself that officers of Corporation B reasonably concluded
that Corporation B was also a client. In other words, the entity rule is
merely a rule that displaces what might otherwise be a per se rule com-
pelling the conclusion that a lawyer who represents an entity-by that
fact alone-represents one or more constituents. But it has no greater
power. It does not by itself preclude a wider set of representations in
circumstances sufficiently indicating either that the parties so understood
their relationship 99 or that, as the lawyer should reasonably have known,
the putative client reasonably relied on the lawyer to protect its inter-
ests.1" Whether such additional representation exists requires a close
and detailed examination of the circumstances.
Suppose, for example, that Parent's general counsel calls Lawyer
and asks her to represent Parent and Subsidiary in litigation filed against
both of them. Lawyer proceeds to do so and, although she enters an
appearance for both, her only relationship is with officers and employees
96. Supra text accompanying notes 68-79.
97. Cf. PROPosED FINAL RESTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 212 cmt. (e) (stating unless lawyer
and constituent enter into client-lawyer relationship, such individual is not client of lawyer).
98. Similarly, it is wrong to read the lawyer codes or substantive law as if it precluded
representation of an entity. On the other hand, an occasional authority has proceeded on a contrary
assumption, holding, in effect, that a lawyer represents only a constituent or an entity, but cannot
represent the other by force of something like a law of physics. See, e.g., D. C. Ethics Opin. 259,
Oct. 18, 1995 (because, under local substantive law, lawyer retained by personal representative of
estate of incapacitated person or conservator of such a person represents the personal representative
or conservator and not the estate, lawyer may not bring action against fraudulent personal
representative or conservator on behalf of estate).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
100. See supra text accompanying note 76.
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of Parent. Does Lawyer have a client-lawyer relationship with Subsidi-
ary, as well as with Parent? May another lawyer in Lawyer's office file a
suit against Subsidiary? May an officer of Subsidiary (who is authorized
within the corporate structure to do so) assert the attorney-client privilege
if Lawyer is called to testify?' ° ' Again, without additional facts no confi-
dent answer to such questions can be given. All depends on what the
party with the burden of proof on the issue can demonstrate to the satis-
faction of the tribunal with respect to the reasonable understandings of
the parties.
IV. LATERAL-DIMENSION CORPORATE CONFLICTS02
(1) In General
Lateral-dimension conflicts, as we use the phrase here, are those
corporate-family conflicts that can be graphed at any single moment on
the basis of the entity's current SEC filings dealing with affiliate organi-
zations-those in which the corporation owns a significant interest.
10 3
The divergent ways in which courts deal with such conflicts questions
are nicely illustrated by a pair of 1997 cases decided by different
courts-both involving the same core facts, corporate arrangements, and
101. See generally JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATroRNEY-CoRPoRATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE
2.02[4] (2d ed. 1990) (analyzing corporate-family issues in the context of the privilege ). See also
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950) (on facts, all
affiliated corporations were client where all used same in-house and outside counsel, legal affairs
were closely related, and, except for convenience in billing and accounting, no effort made to treat
one entity as "the client").
102. See Professor Ronald D. Rotunda, Sister Act: Conflicts of Interest with Sister
Corporations, 1 J. INsrrr. STUDy OF LEGAL ETHics 215 (1996). This article was republished, in
revised form-and notably omitted a Rube Goldberg cartoon. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflicts
Problems When Representing Members of Corporate Families, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655
(1997). At several points below, I critique several of what I understand to be Professor Rotunda's
positions in these articles.
103. See generally 17 CFR § 210 ("Form and Content of and Requirements for Financial
Statements, Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, Investment Company Act of 1940, and Energy Policy and Conservation Act
of 1975"). There are definitions provided in these regulations for "affiliate," "control," "majority-
owned subsidiary," "parent," and "significant subsidiary." See generally supra note 30. See also 17
CFR § 210.1-02(x) ("subsidiary" as "an affiliate controlled by such person directly, or indirectly
through one or more intermediaries"); 17 CFR § 210.1-02(y) ("totally held subsidiary" defined
basically as entity wholly-owned by parent or parent's totally-held subsidiaries and with no
significant debt to third parties which is not guaranteed by parent); 17 CFR § 210.1-02(aa) ("wholly-
owned subsidiary").
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law firm, but employing very different standards and reaching potentially
opposing conclusions."
Simplifying facts and the parties somewhat,' in 1994 PMNC, a
joint venture, entered into an agreement with Brooklyn Navy Yard
Cogeneration Partners ("Partners")" °6 to build a congeneration facility10 7
at the yard. One of the three joint venturers in PMNC was Parsons Main
of New York, Inc. ("Parsons-NY"), a subsidiary of The Parsons Corpora-
tion ("Parsons").1 "8 As part of the arrangement, Parsons guaranteed the
work of Parsons-NY in a separate guaranty contract. Starting with pre-
liminary legal work performed in 1991 leading to the agreement, Part-
ners was represented throughout by the law firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb,
Green & MacRae, L.L.P. ("LeBoeuf'). By February of 1997 the project
had collapsed. In a familiar race to the courthouse, each side started law-
suits in California and New York, in both instances in state court. In
California, Parsons and PMNC sued Partners for breach of contract and
declaratory relief, raising questions about the parties' obligations under
the agreement and the guaranty contract. LeBoeuf entered an appearance
for defendant Partners. Two weeks after the California action was com-
menced, Partners, represented by LeBoeuf, sued Parsons in the New
York action, seeking very substantial damages.
In both actions, Parsons moved to disqualify LeBoeuf on the ground
that Parsons' wholly-owned subsidiary, The Ralph M. Parsons Company
104. See Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) [hereinafter Navy Yard I]; Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v.
PMNC, 663 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)[hereinafter Navy Yard II].
105. Most of the facts appear in Navy Yard I. See Navy Yard I, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997). The recounting of facts in Navy Yard I is quite cryptic, but not inconsistent with that in
Navy Yard I. See Navy Yard II , 663 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
106. Partners actually included Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners, L.P. as well as
Mission Energy New York, Inc., L.P. However, exactly whom LeBoeuf was representing on that
side of the "versus" was not relevant in either decision.
107. A cogeneration facility is one that produces a form of power-steam- or hydro-power, for
example-that can be employed to perform two functions, one of which is generating electricity.
Thus, the steam- or hydro-power can be employed to turn a factory's assembly-line turbines, while
also producing electrical energy. Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, a local
electrical utility can be required to purchase, at terms favorable to the seller, electrical power
produced by the cogeneration facility.
108. See DuN & BRAosTRr, supra note 32, at 1391-92 (For a sketch of the corporate family
tree). This reference indicates that at the time of publication there were 46 corporate affiliates in the
Parsons corporate family. Parsons Main of New York, Incorporated is listed as a "level 3"
subsidiary, meaning that it is a subsidiary of Parsons Main, Incorporated, which in turn is listed as a
level-2 subsidiary of Main C T Corporation, which in turn is listed as a level-I subsidiary of Parsons
Corporation.
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("RMP"),°  was a long-standing LeBoeuf client11° and in fact was con-
currently being advised by LeBoeuf lawyers on questions of Russian law
relating to a U.S. government building project in Moscow in which RMP
had an interest. It seems clear that the two LeBoeuf representations were
factually unrelated. On the other hand, legal matters for Parsons and its
subsidiaries were all centralized in the office of general counsel for Par-
sons. We are told, but only in the most general terms, that there were
some (perhaps many) common officers between Parsons and its subsidi-
aries,"' but neither opinion tells us the extent to which there were com-
mon officers specifically between Parsons and RMP.
In the California action-Navy Yard I-the California appellate
court reversed an order of the trial court disqualifying LeBoeuf. The trial
court had based its ruling on the ground that a "unity of interest[s]""'
existed between RMP and Parsons and, thus, that LeBoeuf had an imper-
missible concurrent-representation conflict of interest. The corporate-
109. The facts are somewhat more complex. RMP was the client in several of the prior
representations. In others, and in the concurrent representation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
RMP-a grand-child corporation of Parsons-was the client.
110. Neither opinion indicates why the conflict took so long to surface. Navy Yard I indicates
that at LeBoeuf's end, representation of RMP by the firm commenced on the lateral hiring of a
lawyer from another firm, who brought the client with him, but who did not perform a conflicts
check regarding Parsons. See Navy Yard I, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419, 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). At
Parsons' end, it apparently did not notice or at least did not object when LeBoeuf surfaced as the law
firm representing Partners in the negotiations over the Brooklyn Navy Yard cogeneration agreement
and its pre-litigation aftermath. The New York court noted this aspect of the story, but seems not to
have relied on any notion of estoppel or laches in finding no conflict. See Navy Yard II, 663
N.Y.S.2d 499, 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). The LeBoeuf lawyer representing RMP practiced in a
different office from the lawyers representing Partners, which the New York court noted with some
emphasis. See Navy Yard II, 663 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). Thus, there was less
risk that they would have been aware of each others' work and, thus, less concern about transmittal
of confidential information. (In any event, confidentiality turned out not to be a concern, given the
court's apparently well-founded conclusion that there was no factual linkage between the matters on
which LeBoeuf represented RMP and the Navy Yard litigation. Speculating further, it is also
possible that different lawyers in Parsons' office of general counsel worked on the two matters and,
again, did not notice the issue of conflict until litigation may have centralized the matters in the same
set of Parsons in-house lawyers.
Partners argued in the California action that Parsons had waived its objection "because, for
almost three years before bringing the disqualification motion, Parson's general counsel actually
knew LeBoeuf was representing [Partners] adversely to Parsons in negotiations concerning [the
cogeneration facility] at the same time he was approving payment of invoices for services rendered
by LeBoeuf to RMP." See Navy Yard I, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419, 426 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). The trial
court had rejected the waiver argument, and the appellate court held that it need not reach it in view
of the remand. Id. It seems doubtful that the court would have agreed that an implied waiver as to
hostile negotiations, if factually established, would extend as well to later hostile litigation.
I 11. Navy Yard 11, supra note 110, at 500, note 1 (parent and subsidiary "share common legal
and accounting departments and have some officers in common").
112. Navy Yard I, supra note 110, at 422.
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family conflict issue was one of first impression in California state
courts, 1 3 but the appellate court was quite content to base its decision
almost entirely upon its agreement with an earlier California ethics com-
mittee opinion,"' which in turn had adopted the entity-representation
concept as the appropriate unitary test for conflicts in such a situation,
subject only to an "alter ego" exception.11 5 The California appellate
court thus reversed to permit the trial court to determine whether parent
Parsons was the alter ego of subsidiary RMP. From all that appears, the
appellate court recognized only the alter ego concept as a basis for find-
ing a conflict. From all that appears in the opinion (or in the ethics opin-
ion on which the court relied), a finding of even strong factual
relationship between the two representations would have been irrelevant.
On the same set of facts, the New York court in Navy Yard II used a
very different approach before it concluded that no conflict precluded
LeBoeuf's representation of Partners. Relying entirely on federal deci-
sions sketching out a "taint the trial" test by which they assess a disquali-
fication motion,116 the court first noted that there was no risk of tainting
the trial through misuse of confidential information because the matters
in which LeBoeuf represented Parsons' subsidiaries were not factually
linked to the matter in which LeBoeuf represented Parsons' adversary
here.117 The court's unmistakable predicate was that the existence of
such linkage would have required disqualification. The second situation
in which disqualification could be required, in the court's view, was
where loyalty considerations were implicated such that "the dual repre-
113. See id. See also Truck Ins. Exchange v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992)(stating the court had accepted without question the parties' concession that
representation of a related affiliate would constitute an impermissible conflict)[hereinafter Truck
Exchange]. In Navy Yard I, the court's determination that Truck Exchange was not precedent seems
clearly correct.
114. See Cal. St. B. Standing Comm. Prof. Resp. & Conduct, Formal Op. No. 1989-113 (1990)
(adopting "alter ego" view of parent-subsidiary conflict questions). See also infra text accompanying
notes 134-41 (discussing the ethics committee's opinion).
115. Navy Yard I, supra note 110, at 424-25.
116. The court did note that "this Court is rejecting, ab initio, the theory propounded by the
defendants that the two corporations should be treated as one entity for conflicts purposes," but on
the ground that "no evidence has been submitted to demonstrate that the 'dominion of the parent
over the subsidiary is so complete, the interference so obtrusive' as to rebut the presumption that
they are separate and distinct legal entities .... Navy Yard 11, supra note 110, at 663. (quoting
American Psych Systems, Inc. v. Options Indep. Practice Ass'n, 643 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (N.Y. S.Ct.
1996)). The cited case held, in effect, that a sufficient showing of alter ego relationship had been
shown. See infra text accompanying notes 198-210 (discussing further the showing of alter ego).
The court in Navy Yard 11 simply did not reach the issue whether it would accept an alter ego
exception in addition to the confidential-information exception that it applied.
117. Navy Yard 1I, supra note 110, at 501. On confidentiality-based disqualification in affiliate
cases. See infra text at notes 233-49.
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sentation undermines the attorneys [sic] vigor in pursuing the interests of
one of his current clients."' t8 The court found that consideration not
applicable here, apparently on the notion that LeBoeuf's conflict would
not impair its representation of Partners in the case before the court. 119
Navy Yard II stands in vivid contrast to Navy Yard I. Its confidentiality
and representation-impairment concepts would apply quite without
regard to any alter ego inquiry.
The Navy Yard decisions reflect only some of the divergence among
the few reported authorities on lateral-dimension conflicts. Much is at
stake in the controversy. Corporate-family clients can legitimately claim
a strong interest in ensuring the loyalty of their outside legal counsel, 120
as well as in effectively protecting the corporation's conduct of its legal
affairs. 12' At the same time, their corporate and other adversaries (and
they themselves on other occasions) will have an interest in the free
choice of counsel, including, possibly, long-standing counsel who know
their affairs expertly and who can quickly and efficiently focus on the
client's particular legal needs. For lawyers, their interests are also
double-edged. On the one hand, sheer size of law firms, and concomitant
swelling in the size of their client base, has led to increasing constriction
of the ability of firms to grow still further through adding to their client
base and increasing the number of matters that the firm handles for each
client. 122 Tightening or loosening of corporate-family conflicts rules will
increase or relieve that constriction. On the other hand, pushing the
envelope of conflicts too fast or too far threatens to undermine the confi-
dence of corporate clients in general in the fair-mindedness and loyalty
of their outside legal counsel.
(2) The Approaches
In attempting to accommodate those contending policies in lateral-
dimension situations, courts and ethics committees have developed, as
mentioned, a plethora of approaches. I next survey several of the major
118. Navy Yard II, supra note 110, at 501. (quoting Fisons Corp. v. Atochem Corp., No. 90
Civ. 1080 (JMC), 1990 WL 180551 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1990).
119. Navy Yard II, supra note 110, at 501, note 5. The court did not consider whether
LeBoeufs dual representation would impair its representation of the firm's other client-the
objecting client in the out-of-court representation-perhaps in the belief that such impairment, even
if it could be shown, would not "taint the trial." Thus, at a minimum, the Navy Yard I test may be
significantly narrower than the test that would be applied in New York for disciplinary purposes. On
loyalty-based considerations in corporate-affiliate cases in general, see infra text at notes 160-92 &
250-57.
120. Navy Yard H, supra note 110, at 501, note 5.
121. See infra text accompanying notes 250-58.
122. See Wolfi-am, Former-Client Conflicts, supra note 9, at 689.
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approaches briefly. As will be seen, while each surveyed approach can
marshal arguments in support, all are, in the end, unsatisfactory. I defer
to a later point12 3 discussion of more fine-tuned theories, such as that of
the newly-amended District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct,
which to me make more analytical and intuitive sense.
a. The All-Affiliates Position
One variant of per se rules on the corporate-family set of problems
takes the corporate-family-loyalty position to an extreme. It posits that at
least parent corporations and their wholly-owned subsidiaries must be
uniformly treated as a single client for conflicts purposes. 1" That posi-
tion was also passionately espoused in dissents in an ABA ethics com-
mittee opinion. 2' The point was pushed in one federal district court
decision as far as holding that a conflict precluded a lawyer's representa-
tion of a client against a parent when the lawyer concurrently represented
a subsidiary in which the parent owned only a 51% interest.126 The
notion here is straightforward-or at least can be expressed briefly: the
123. See infra text accompanying notes 228-57.
124. See Strategem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l, N.V., 756 F.Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(stating that a lawyer representing wholly-owned subsidiary is held to be in client-lawyer
relationship with parent as well for concurrent-representation conflict purposes); Gould, Inc. v.
Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1125-26 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (same); Cf McCourt
Co. v. FPC Properties, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 1234 (Mass. 1982) (stating a lawyer who represents parent
corporation in pending personal injury cases is disqualified from representing plaintiff in unrelated
litigation against both parent and wholly-owned subsidiary). Other courts have given an oblique nod
to an all-affiliates position by assuming arguendo that proceeding adversely to an affiliate is the
same as proceeding adversely against the client, but finding no conflict on other grounds. See
Carlyle Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Crossland Savings, FSB, 944 F. Supp. 341, 346 (D.NJ. 1996)
(assuming, but refusing, to order disqualification where asserted conflict was created by merger
activities of objecting party).
The position of the RESTATEMENT is incomplete on the issue. We do state that the fact that a
lawyer represents one corporation does not "thereby" entail that the lawyer represents affiliated
entities. See PROPOSED FiNAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 201 cmt. (d), at 548-49. We go on to
suggest that the resulting position is clearly not the no-affiliate position. See id. at 549 ("in some
situations, however, the financial or personal relationship between the lawyer's client and other
persons or entities might be such that the lawyer's obligations to the client will extend to those other
persons or entities as well. That will be true, for example, where financial loss or benefit to the non-
client person or entity will have a direct, adverse impact on the client."). /d
125. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 95-390, at 19-24
(1995) (dissenting opinion of Lawrence J. Fox); see also id. at 16 (opinion of Deborah A. Coleman,
dissenting in part) (objecting that requiring corporate client to make choice between objectionable
concurrent representation by lawyer and firing law firm and finding new counsel imposed
unacceptable burden on client). See id. at 17-19 (dissenting opinion of Richard L. Amster). See id
at 24 (opinion of Kim Taylor-Thompson, concurring in dissents of Amster and Fox). See infra text
accompanying notes 142-48 (discussing the position of the majority).
126. Vanderveer Group, Inc. v. Petruny, No. 93-3677, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11131 (E.D. Pa.,
July 21, 1993).
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"client" is the entire corporate family. A lawyer who represents any
member of the family is deemed to represent them all for conflicts pur-
poses. Thus, any adverse representation against any other family member
is prohibited.
The problem with the all-affiliates position is its sheer exuberance.
It does not so much seek to accommodate or explain away the entity-
representation concept as to ignore it altogether. 127 Whether admitting it
or not, the all-affiliates theory necessarily extends its intra-family con-
flict prohibition solely because of the relationship between the corporate
affiliates. But, at the least, doing so is by some measure hostile to the
entity-representation concept. Surely, opponents of the all-affiliates posi-
tion make an argument worthy of response when they point out that
among the corporate constituents whom the entity-representation rules in
the lawyer codes explicitly exclude from the definition of entity are its
"shareholders." '12 8
The all-affiliates position is also counter-intuitive in some possible
illustrations. Perhaps the strongest situation in which it seems wrong is
the admittedly uncommon situation in which a parent corporation owns a
subsidiary corporation solely for purposes of investment and plays no
part in its management or control (other than through selecting its board
as would any shareholder), and where the lawyer's adverse representa-
tion would not significantly threaten the economic value of the client
parent's investment."2 9 In such situations, and possibly in other more
common situations in which the functional and financial impact of the
lawyer's representation against an affiliate would not materially affect
127. None of the authorities cited in the two preceding footnotes mentions the entity-
representation concept. This is particularly telling in the ABA ethics committee dissents, because, as
will be seen, the majority opinion rested its contrary view heavily on that concept. See infra text
accompanying note 125 & 145. The ABA dissenters do allude implicitly to the concept in arguing
that the "indirect" financial impact on the client-related corporation (through its impact on the
balance-sheet of the affiliated non-client entity) will be felt by the client corporation. See infra text
accompanying notes 176-77.
128. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 1, at 1.13(e). ABA Model Rule 1.13 implicitly defines an
entity's constituents to include its "directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents". Id. cmts. (1) & (2) (similar). See Calif. Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-600(D)
(1989) (similar). See also id. at 3-600(E) (stating "A member representing an organization may also
represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents,
subject to [general conflicts rules]").
On the other hand, the exclusion of "shareholders" from those being represented when the
lawyer represents the entity works only one way in parent-subsidiary situations. That is, it may help
to explain why a lawyer's representation of a subsidiary does not necessarily entail representation of
the parent, but it does not explain why representation of the parent does not extend to the subsidiary.
In the latter relationship, the subsidiary is not a "shareholder" of the parent.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 251-53 (discussing further a lawyer's adverse
representation).
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the corporate entity that the lawyer represents, many lawyers and judges
will feel that the prohibition is overly formal-precluding a representa-
tion in the absence of any discernible practical reason why the corporate
client would object-no such reason, that is, other than unattractively
tactical reasons, such as that of depriving an opponent of the benefit of
counsel known to be effective. Finally, the all-affiliates position seems
sustainable, if ever, only in the extreme situation of wholly-owned sub-
sidiary and parent. It quickly loses its intuitive and emotive appeal when
extended to sister corporations, and, even more clearly, to situations
involving more attenuated relationships, such as parent and partially-
owned subsidiaries.
On the other hand, the all-affiliates position does have much
appeal. As will be seen,13° an intuitive problem with the opposing, no-
affiliates theory is that the latter seems to raise the entity-representation
concept to the level of an overriding principle. In the process, the com-
peting no-affiliates theory places overarching importance on legally-dis-
cernible features of corporate families that may be merely formal and
accidental and have little correspondence with operational reality.131 To
take perhaps the strongest case, an enterprise that is managed and oper-
ated on a unitary basis could just as readily be a single corporation or a
family of multiple corporations-at least it could just as readily take
either form as far as any significance that form could have to the lawyer
in the course of the lawyer's work. Why should the corporate family's
election -of one corporate form or another-by hypothesis an election
made for purposes having nothing to do with the retention of lawyers-
control entirely the reach of the loyalty owed by a law firm representing
one legally-definable "part" of the enterprise?
b. The No-Affiliates Position: Its California Origins
Nonetheless, at a categorical extreme from the all-affiliates posi-
tion, Navy Yard 1132 is typical of three judicial decisions in California
state and federal courts embracing the categorical no-affiliates rule. It
refuses to extend disabling conflicts further among members of a corpo-
rate family than the lawyer's actual representation, narrowly conceived,
with a begrudging and presumably narrow exception for alter ego enti-
130. See infra text accompanying notes 150-59.
131. See id.
132. Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997). See supra text at notes 103-20.
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ties. 133 No other exceptions are admitted or even discussed. Those deci-
sions accept and build upon an originating California ethics committee
opinion, California Opinion 1989-113.13 For a state ethics opinion, Cali-
fornia Opinion 1989-113 has been unusually influential, both with courts
there, with ethics committees elsewhere, 135 and, through the latter set of
ethics committee opinions, with a scattering of recent decisions in other
jurisdictions.1 36 California Opinion 1989-113 seems to have originated
the no-affiliates approach out of the whole cloth. It is typical of several
similar decisions in purporting to find fully sufficient justification for the
no-affiliates position in the entity-representation rule137 itself. At least
one commentator apparently agrees. 138 But, as already suggested, 1 39 and
as will be elaborated upon below, 140 the entity-representation concept
does not invariably create walls as impregnable as such a usage
imagines. In addition, the alter ego exception to the no-affiliates concept
is highly problematical.14 ' Most importantly perhaps, the no-affiliates
concept runs strongly against the grain of standard conflict of interest
analysis.
c. ABA Formal Opinion 95-390 Partially Buys Into the
California Approach
In 1995, a slim majority' 4 2 of the ABA's ethics-opinion-writing
committee struggled to a position akin to that of California Opinion
133. Apex Oil Co. v. Wickland Oil Co., CIV-S-94-1499-DFL-GGH, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6398, at *6 note 3 (E.D. Cal., Feb. 28, 1995); Teradyne, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C-91-0344
MHP ENE, 1991 WL 239940 *4 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991).
134. Cal. St. B. Standing Comm. on Prof. Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1989-113,
1989 WL 253261 (1989).
135. See, e.g., Ala. Ethics Opin. RO-92-20 at 1 (1992); Il. St. B. Ass'n Opin. 95-15, 1996 WL
478489, at *3 (May 17, 1996); N.Y. Cty. Law. Ass'n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Opin. 684, 1991 WL
755940, at *2 (June, 1991). The California opinion was also cited favorably by the ABA ethics
committee in ABA Formal Op. 95-390, at 10 (1995).
136. See, e.g., Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Sprint Publishing & Advertising, Inc., No. 95 C
5825, 1996 WL 99902 at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. . Feb. 29, 1996) (rejecting motion for disqualification on
basis of ABA Formal Opinion 95-390).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 37-50.
138. See Rotunda, supra note 102, at 678-79. On the other hand, I may misread Professor
Rotunda's published work, or he may have altered his view. Speaking at the Hofstra conference at
which the substance of this paper was orally presented, Professor Rotunda indicated his general
agreement with rejection of either the all-affiliates or no-affiliates extremes and adoption of
something like the approach urged here.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
140. See infra text accompanying notes 150-59.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 198-210.
142. The majority opinion, which traditionally is not signed, was, I am informed, written
primarily by the committee's former chair David B. Isbell. It was concurred in by then-chair
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1989-113 in the course of construing the conflict of interest demands of
the ABA's Model Rules on conflicts. The opinion, 143 on which the
badly-divided committee reportedly worked for two years,' 44 generally
accepted the argument that the entity-representation rule permitted law-
yers to regard as their client only those members of a corporate family
with which the lawyers maintained a direct client-lawyer relationship.
1 45
The majority noted two exceptions, in which representation of an affiliate
nonetheless would be prohibited. One prohibited situation exists where
the objecting affiliate is the alter ego of the corporation directly repre-
sented146 obviously is derived from the California authority. The second
prohibited situation covers instances where the lawyer obtained confi-
dential information from the corporate client that would be relevant to
the lawyer's adverse representation against an affiliate1 47 (where, in other
words, the two matters are substantially related). The latter exception is
not found in any of the California authorities and, given the ABA major-
ity's heavy reliance on the entity-representation concept, seems again to
be a whole-cloth invention-if an invention with intuitive appeal. The
rationale of the ABA majority for adopting its approach, resting as did
Margaret C. Love and by members Ralph G. Elliot, George W. Jones, Jr., Marvin L. Karp, and
Arthur W. Liebold, Jr. Member Deborah A. Coleman signed an opinion "concurring in part and
dissenting in part," although her disagreement with the majority seems quite all-inclusive. Members
Richard L. Amster and Lawrence J. Fox wrote separate dissents. Member Kim Taylor-Thompson
concurred in the dissents of both Mr. Amster and Mr. Fox. As I tally it, the resulting vote of the
committee was 6-4 in favor of the majority position.
143. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390
(1995) [hereinafter ABA Opinion 95-390]. There are several student critiques of this issue. See, e.g.,
Michael Sacksteder, Note, Formal Opinion 95-390 of the ABA's Ethics Committee: Corporate of
Clients, Conflicts of Interest, and Keeping the Lid on Pandora's Box, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 741 (1997).
The ABA's opinion was styled broadly by its majority as if it applied to all conflicts problems
involving corporate-family conflicts. ("Conflicts of Interest in the Corporate Family Context").
ABA Opinion 95-390 at 1. But the opinions of the committee members discuss only the problem of
concurrent-representation conflicts. The apparent implication is that similar considerations would
govern former-client conflicts under the substantial-relationship standard of ABA Model Rule
1.9(a)-particularly, perhaps, in assessing whether the later representation is "adverse" to the former
client. See infra text accompanying notes 243-249 (for caveats).
144. See id. at 17 (Amster dissenting opinion); Cf. id. at 19 (Fox dissenting opinion) ("This
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has wrestled with the issues of
conflict of interest in the corporate family context for years . .
145. See id, at 6-7.
146. See id. at 10-11.
147. See id. at 10. The majority's view may be limited to situations in which, as part of the
process by which the lawyer acquires confidential information from the subsidiary, the lawyer enters
into a direct client-lawyer relationship with the subsidiary. See id. That was only one of the two
alternative bases for the decision on which the majority relies. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). As will be later
seen, the court there also relied on a theory of derivative fiduciary duty, not involving a finding of
such a client-lawyer relationship. See infra text accompanying note 195.
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the California ethics committee entirely on the entity-representation con-
cept, is not convincing for reasons that will shortly be examined. 48
Moreover, the two major exceptions to the ABA's version of the no-
affiliates approach raise their own doubts about the analytical soundness
of the majority's approach on its own terms.
(3) Lateral-Dimension Conflicts-Theoretical and
Practical Considerations
Given the array of approaches, and foregoing, for the present, an
attempt to articulate a sounder approach, it would be profitable to
examine in greater detail the principle considerations that seem to bear
on each of those claimed tests for corporate-family conflicts. Those con-
siderations include the entity-representation concept itself, the loyalty
principle that informs all conflicts analysis, considerations of confidenti-
ality such as that causing concern to the ABA majority in Formal Opin-
ion 95-390, and other considerations that have been advanced. In what
immediately follows, I am at pains only to address what I consider to be
erroneous applications of those concepts. At a later point,149 I consider
how those concepts, properly understood, lead to a view of corporate-
family conflicts that takes a middle position.
a. Bearing of the Entity-Representation Concept on the
Corporate-Family Conflict Problem
As already noted, those authorities espousing a narrow rule for cor-
porate-family conflicts rely heavily, if not exclusively, on the entity-rep-
resentation rule.15° On the other hand, those espousing a very expansive
rule have ignored entity-representation considerations, perhaps sug-
gesting that it has no bearing at all (although apparently lacking an ade-
quate explanation of why that should be the case).15 ' The entity-
representation concept does have a proper function in the debate, but it
hardly proves to be of decisive power.
Recall that the entity-representation rule was designed to separate
the interests of a corporate entity from the interests of its constituents,
such as its officers or employees, and as a corollary to blunt possible
illegitimate attempts that might be made by such constituents to control
or influence a representation.'5 2 Significant for proponents of a narrow
148. See infra text accompanying notes 150-59.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 228-57.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
151. See supra text accompanying note 127.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
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prohibition is the inclusion of "shareholders" among the constituents. 153
That inclusion is, of course, entirely appropriate for the purposes for
which the entity-representation concept was devised. While a corporate
lawyer speaks with, and receives instructions from, those agents of a cor-
porate client who are lawfully delegated the power to instruct the corpo-
ration's counsel,1 54 the lawyer generally should not hearken to the
possibly dissonant voices of even majority shareholders of the corporate
client. 155 Beyond not heeding their actual communications, the corpora-
tion' s lawyer may not in any other way allow exercise of her professional
judgment on behalf of the corporation to be influenced by the aim of
furthering the interests of a non-client constituent rather than the interests
of the client entity.' 56
Central, therefore, to the entity-representation concept is the law's
concern with differing interests between represented entity and non-rep-
resented constituents and protecting the entity by prohibiting the risk of
impairment of the work of the entity's "lawyer that might be caused were
the lawyer permitted to heed such differing interests. But, given that pur-
pose for the entity-representation concept, to treat it as if it mandated a
narrow corporate-family conflict rule is to carry the concept far beyond
its intended reach.' 57 For the plain fact about all instances of its claimed
application for corporate-family conflicts purposes, 158 in which either the
153. See supra text accompanying note 128.
154. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GovEuRNo LAWYERS § 155 cmt. (d) (Tentative Draft No. 8,
1997) (tentatively approved, 1997).
155. Cf PROPOSED FINAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 212 cmt. (e) (unless lawyer for
corporation and individual constituent form personal client-lawyer relationship, the individual is not
a client of the lawyer).
156. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GovENINmo LAWYERS, supra note 154, § 155 cmt. (b), at
176-77:
A lawyer representing an organization deals with individuals such as its officers, directors,
and employees, who serve as constituents of the organization. Such individuals acting
under the organization's authority retain and direct the lawyer to act on behalf of the
organization. . . Nonetheless, personal dealings with such persons do not lessen the
lawyer's responsibilities to the organization as client, and the lawyer may not let such
dealings hinder the lawyer in the performance of those responsibilities ....
Il
157. The author of the majority opinion in ABA Formal Opinion 95-390 apparently appreciated
the force of these considerations. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, supra
note 143. The formal opinion does not in fact purport to find in ABA Model Rule 1.13(a) any direct
answer to the corporate-family conflicts puzzle. See id. at 6. The further observation of the majority,
that there is nothing in the rule or its comments indicating support for the all-affiliates position is
clearly correct. See id at 6-7.
158. One wishing to narrow the corporate-family conflict rule might attempt to defend that
position on the ground that ignoring the entity-representation rule in this instance would amount to
sanctioning a lawyer's representation of conflicting interests (those, for example, of the subsidiary
against those of its affiliated parent). The answer to the argument, of course, is that, so long as there
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lawyer's original corporate client or an affiliate of that client objects to
the lawyer's subsequent representation of an adverse party, is that their
interests do not conflict or differ. That is so with respect to the matter of
the original representation of one affiliate, the matter of the subsequent
representation against the interests of another affiliate, and the specific
question of the propriety of the lawyer's later representation. If a case
arises in which the two affiliates do have differing interests on those
questions, the entity-representation concept should, of course, be given
robust application. 159 Most often, however, there will be an absence of
differing interests between the corporate affiliates with respect to those
questions, and thus the core concern of the entity-representation concept
is simply irrelevant to corporate-family conflicts issues.
Nonetheless, the entity-representation concept is more than a princi-
ple. It is a rule, and it is articulated in the lawyer codes in a general form.
Observing it even in areas beyond the core policy concerns of the rule
serves to further the law's general interest in consistency. As such, it
should be respected where doing so does not create a substantial inroad
on other principles or rules. That suggests, of course, only a weak office
for the entity-representation concept on the question of corporate-family
conflicts. In effect, so long as there is no supervening principle or rule
suggesting that the entity-representation rule should not apply, its appli-
cation is defensible. But, as will be seen, there are several considerations
that argue persuasively for displacing a concept with such a weak justifi-
cation for application. At the same time, there are independent and strong
reasons for rejecting the all-affiliates position and, accordingly, limiting
the reach of corporate-family conflicts.
is no conflict in fact between the affiliated corporations with respect to the question of the lawyer's
disqualification, one need have no present concern with the entity-representation concept and its
dictates. Should those issues arise in a different context, that context (but not the different context of
establishing a corporate-family conflict concept) would be an appropriate point at which to invoke
and apply the entity-representation concept.
159. Note that the situation to be imagined is one in which the affiliates' interests differ on the
question of the lawyer's representation. Differing interests on other issues do not suggest a need for a
narrow corporate-family conflict rule. For example, a regulated subsidiary and a holding-company
parent may have differing interests with the parent on a question of the subsidiary's compliance with
governmental regulations. But that says nothing about whether a law firm currently or formerly
representing the parent on related regulatory compliance issues (and thus, we will imagine, exposed
to confidential information about both parent and subsidiary relating to the regulatory-compliance
issues involved in a subsequent adverse representation against the subsidiary) could legitimately
represent a competitor of the subsidiary in a substantially-related antitrust lawsuit against the
subsidiary. See infra text accompanying notes 233-42.
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b. Loyalty Considerations and the Corporate-Family Conflict
Problem
Myriad authorities have agreed that ensuring that a lawyer remains
loyal to a client's interests lies at the heart of conflict of interest rules.' 6°
Thus, one would expect to see significant discussion of loyalty consider-
ations in attempts to formulate corporate-family conflict rules. On the
whole, however, this aspect of the problem has been neglected, or at best
it has been handled in an unsatisfactory manner. I trace here only those
problematical usages of loyalty dismissed after merely summary men-
tion. A positive theory of client loyalty in the context of corporate-family
conflicts will be discussed below.
16 1
(i) Loyalty in General
One occasionally encounters assertions in the corporate-family liter-
ature that a lawyer who sues the subsidiary of a parent corporation that
the lawyer represents in a factually unrelated matter does not offend any
duty of loyalty owed to the parent client. 162 The assertion is typically
made without any attempt to define what the amorphous concept of "loy-
alty" might entail in the case of a corporate family. The topic of loyalty
in conflicts is a large one that has usefully but not exhaustively been
analyzed in general terms. 163 It finds expression in and is the central
force that should impel interpretation" of both parts of the rule on con-
current-representation1 65 conflicts of interest in the ABA's Model Rules,
Rule 1.7, the relevant portions of which are as follows:
Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule
160. Cf Charles W. Wolfram, supra note 9, at 695 (general irrelevance of loyalty-based, as
opposed to confidentiality-based, considerations, in development of law of former-client conflicts).
161. See infra text accompanying notes 250-57.
162. Rotunda, supra note 138, at 679 ("... .The law firm, after all, is not suing" the client parent
itself, which presumably exhausts the duty of loyalty); See also id at 674 (similar).
163. See, e.g., HAzARD & HODFS, supra note 1, § 1.7:101; MODERN LEGAL. ETmIcs, supra note
1, § 7.1.3 at 316-17; Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEo. J.
LEGAL E-mcs 823 (1992).
164. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 95-390 at 4 (1995)
(majority opinion) (".. . The touchstone of [Rule 1.7], as the Comments to it make clear, is loyalty to
the client."); See also id. cmt. [1]. "Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a
client..." Id. at (3). "As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking
representation directly adverse to that client without that client's consent. Paragraph (a) expresses
that general rule . I. " d. at (4). "Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot
consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests ... " Id.
165. On the application of former-client concepts to corporate-family conflicts, See infra text
accompanying notes 243-49.
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(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's respon-
sibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the law-
yer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
What each of the two different parts of Rule 1.7 are independently
driving at is not entirely clear. 16 6 The comments to the rule indicate that
its central theme is of great importance, stating that "[1]oyalty is an
essential element in the lawyer's relationship with a client," '67 and indi-
cating that loyalty is in some unexplained way implicated in both parts of
Rule 1.7.168 Nothing in the rule or comments says anything notably help-
ful on corporate-family conflicts. 16 9 Somewhat suggestive (although
often over-looked) are the definitions of "consentability" stated in the
first of the two conditions to the consent exception to each subpart. Sub-
part (a)(1) defines consentability in terms of the lawyer's reasonable
belief that representation of one client (here, the client opposed to the
corporate affiliate) will not "adversely affect the lawyer's relationship
with the other client . . . ." That strongly implies that Rule 1.7(a) is
primarily a rule protecting the "relationship" with a client, and in that
sense includes questions of whether a reasonable client, fully informed
166. See Charles W. Wolfram, Parts and Wholes: The Integrity of the Model Rules, 6 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETmics 861, 886-88 (1993) [hereinafter Wolfram, Parts and Wholes] (critiquing the
unexplained separation of concepts in rule 1.7(a) and (b)).
167. MODEL RuLE, supra note 1, at 1.7 cmt. (1).
168. See id. at cmts. (3) & (4).
169. Comment (11), although referring to whether a conflict exists and not whether a client-
lawyer relationship is present, does indicate that "[c]onflicts of interest in contexts other than
litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there is
potential for adverse effect include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the
client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual
conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. The question
is often one of proximity and degree." See id. at cmt. (11).
Moreover, comment (8) does refer to a representation involving "an enterprise with diverse
operations." See id. at cmt. (8). But I agree with the majority in ABA Formal Opin. 95-390 that the
reference is to a single corporation with divisions, and not to a corporation with subsidiaries or other
similar affiliates. Thus, the requirement stated in the comment that "both clients consent upon
consultation" tells us nothing about corporate-family conflicts. ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note
143, at 6.
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about the matter, would have substantial reason to distrust the lawyer
should the lawyer or her firm accept the arguably conflicting representa-
tion. Seen in contrast to the standard for consentability in subpart (b)(1),
which focuses upon adverse effect upon the quality of the lawyer's work,
the standard of Rule 1.7(a) is best understood as concerned with rela-
tional as opposed to representational considerations-here the personal
client-lawyer relationship between the law firm and, in our inquiry, the
law firm's initial corporate client.
An additional preliminary point to be resolved about ABA Model
Rule 1.7 concerns its textually different treatment of the question of who
must consent to waive a conflict that would otherwise exist. Under Rule
1.7(a) "each client" must consent, while Rule 1.7(b), in one reading,
requires consent only of one person, "the client." One possible meaning
suggested by use of the singular "client" in Rule 1.7(b) is that consent of
the other client is not required. Such a reading of the text led the majority
in ABA Formal Opinion 95-390 to state, in effect, that corporate-family
conflicts, if thought to exist under Rule 1.7(b), could always be cured by
consent of only the lawyer's other client-the client proceeding
adversely to the corporate-family affiliate-without obtaining consent of
the corporate-family member whom the lawyer indisputably
represents. 170
That seriously misreads the rule. Rule 1.7(b) should instead be con-
strued to require the consent of both affected clients, for at least two
reasons. First, as a textual matter, the reason for the use of singular and
plural in the two sub-rules is clear, and it clearly does not preclude the
necessity of obtaining consent from multiple clients under both sub-rules.
Rule 1.7(a) pertains only to client-client conflicts, and it correspondingly
requires consents of multiple clients ("the clients") in all instances. How-
ever, although Rule 1.7(b) also deals with client-client conflicts (those
multiple-client representations in which the lawyer's work will be
impaired), 171 it deals with several other sources of conflict as well-
conflicts produced by the lawyer's own interests and the interests of non-
170. ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 5; See also Rotunda, supra note 138, at 684
(apparently agreeing with that reading). As will be seen, the committee's misreading of the rule
proved harmless. See infra note 173.
I note that an illustration in the RESTATEMENT takes a position consistent with that of the
majority and at odds with the position I advance here. See PROPosED FiNAL RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 201 cmt. d illustration 8. As stated in the text, I now believe that the more appropriate
analysis requires consent of both affected clients, rather than the one who is speculated (stipulated in
the illustration) to be the sole client at risk.
171. See infra text accompanying notes 254-57 (for a further discussion of the representation-
impairment conflicts under Rule 1.7(b) in the context of corporate-family conflicts).
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clients. Thus, a reference in Rule 1.7(b), similar to that in Rule 1.7(a), to
consent by plural "clients" would have been inappropriate. Singular ref-
erence in Rule 1.7(b) to "the client" is fully intelligible without the fur-
ther gloss that consent of only one of multiple clients cures all Rule
1.7(b) conflict, including those involving multiple clients.1 72
Second, even if the text were construed to apply literally only to one
client in all applications of Rule 1.7(b), the analysis takes only one of
two steps that must be taken. Clearly, no matter how woodenly read, the
text requires consent of the client proceeding against the corporate fam-
ily, based on the risk of material impairment of the lawyer's representa-
tion of that client. That risk, of course, does not foreclose another-that
the lawyer's second representation-of the corporate-family member-
will, for similar reasons of confused loyalty, also be impaired, requiring
consent of that client under Rule 1.7(b) as well. That client is, obviously,
a client as well, and there is no apparent reason for thinking that the rule
"exhausts" itself in application to only a single client or, if so, why the
client that exhausts the rule should not be the corporate-family client.173
(ii) Measuring Adverseness: The Financial Impact of a
"Directly Adverse" Representation
To what extent does ABA Model Rule 1.7(a), 174 with its prohibition
of "directly adverse" conflicts, bear on corporate-family conflicts? Per-
haps the most intuitively obvious objection to the broadly permissive no-
affiliates position is that representation against a corporate-family affili-
ate is disloyal if, as will often be the case, it will have an adverse finan-
cial impact on the affiliate that the lawyer directly and indisputably
represents. Thus, one well-known decision in the all-affiliates line of
decisions, dealing with a situation where a lawyer represented one client
in factually unrelated litigation against the subsidiary of a corporate cli-
ent, has stated that "the liabilities of a subsidiary corporation directly
172. To be sure, the reference to consent in Rule 1.7(b) could have been better expressed if it
referred to consent of "the client or clients." But the fact that one can think of language that would
make the rule clearer hardly requires that it be given a distorted reading based on its existing
language.
173. That, apparently, in the end is the position of the majority opinion in ABA Formal Opinion
95-390. See ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 5. The majority first took a position contrary
to that taken here on the literal meaning of the singular reference to "client" in the consent language
of Rule 1.7(b), but then concluded that consent of both affected clients may be required as result of
the two-step analysis urged in the text. Id. ("... By its terms, Rules 1.7(b) requires the consent only
of the client whose representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's other duties, but the
lawyer must consider the effect of the simultaneous representation of two clients on each of them,
and obtain consent where required by the Rule."). Id.
174. For the text of the rule, see text accompanying notes 165-66.
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affect the bottom line of the corporate parent." 175 Nonetheless, in
rejecting that argument for finding a "directly adverse" conflict under
Rule 1.7(a), the ABA committee majority apparently took the view that
any financial detriment that could be accurately measured only after
passing the numbers through the books of the affiliated entity caused an
impact to the client corporation that was (merely) "indirect" and not
"direct" as required by the rule:
176
We conclude, then, that although in situations involving an unrelated
suit against an affiliate of a corporate client, the client may be
adversely affected, that adverseness is, for purposes of Rule 1.7, indi-
rect rather than direct, since its immediate impact is on the affiliate,
and only derivatively upon the client. The phrasing of Rule 1.7(a) is
not ambiguous: the reference to a representation that is "directly
adverse" clearly draws a distinction between direct and indirect
adverseness to a client, and therefore draws a bright line striking a
balance between the interests of lawyer and client .... [We see no
principled way otherwise to draw a line short of the point where any
discernible economic impact on a client arising from another represen-
tation (however slight or remote) must be treated as direct adverse-
ness, requiring application of Rule 1.7(a) rather than Rule 1.7(b).177
The direct-indirect-financial-impact position of the majority in ABA
Formal Opinion 95-390 is plainly wrong. The majority cited no authority
for its position, nor could it have done so. Existing case authority was all
to the contrary, including the first decision that apparently confronted the
issue 178 and several decisions intervening before the committee majority
wrote. 17 9 The jarring disconnect between judicial authority and the ABA
175. Strategem Dev. Corp. v. Heron, Int'l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The
language is quoted by the ABA majority. See ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 11.
176. ABA Opinion. 95-390, supra note 143, at 13.
177. Id. (Emphasis in original). Despite the apparent confidence of statement in the quoted
passage, the ABA majority displayed some candor at another point in admitting that its view might
not be accepted everywhere. See id. at 12 ("... Although there is room for dispute on the point, we
believe the better view is that the adverseness in such circumstances is indirect, and not direct."). Id.
178. See North Star Hotels Corp. v. Mid-City Hotel Assocs., 118 F.R.D. 109 (D. Minn. 1987)
(ruling in case of apparent first impression, because success by law firm in suit against non-client
partner could diminish his assets, to detriment of two clients of law firm whose personal debts he
had guaranteed, law firm's representation was "directly adverse" to its two clients)[hereinafter North
Star].
179. To be sure, the majority cited North Star along with other authority, as contrary to its own,
unsupported reading of Rule 1.7(a). See ABA Opinion 95-390, at 13 note 13. The other cited
decisions were Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Anixter Bros., Inc., No. C-1-93-0871, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21012, at *9 (S.D. Ohio, June 27, 1994); Telestat Cable Television, Inc. v. Opryland USA, Inc., No.
90-137-CIV-ORL-19, 1990 WL 303150 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 25, 1990). The Telestat Cable citation is as
given in the formal opinion. However, the cited decision does not involve the point even remotely,
and there is no other reported decision by that name that does involve the point.
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majority's position is not surprising, as the ABA position makes no sense
in terms of the policy that obviously lies behind ABA Model Rule 1.7(a).
While all possible meanings of the "directly adverse" standard employed
in Rule 1.7(a) are not entirely clear (particularly when compared with the
more intelligible representation-impairment concept of Rule 1.7(b)),' 8 °
the rule clearly was meant to cover certain blatant conflicts, such as
engaging in litigation with one's own client that would have relational
consequences that would be self-evidently improper.18  Not to put too
fine a point on it, such conflicts are "no-brainers" 182-requiring no
thought or explanation beyond the observation that clients will almost
certainly and understandably object to such action and lawyers simply do
not do that sort of thing. No-brainer conflicts not involving litigation of a
kind similar to a sue-your-own-client conflict are also readily imagina-
ble. Suppose, for example, that a parent-subsidiary family is structured
so that most or all of the economic value of the family derives from the
subsidiary's activities, as where the client corporation is the bank holding
company that wholly owns a subsidiary bank. A lawsuit by the same
lawyer who represents the parent in an unrelated matter against the sub-
sidiary seeking damages in an amount that would not entirely destroy the
subsidiary but would strip it of much of its economic viability presents
such a no-brainer conflict. 183 Yet, under the "indirect" analysis of the
180. See Wolfram, Parts and Wholes, supra note 166, at 886-88.
181. This is the first concrete illustration of a conflict in the comments to Rule 1.7. See MODEL
RuLEs 1.7, supra note 1, at cmt. [3] ("... Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against
a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated .. "). See, e.g.,
HAzARD & HODES, supra note 1, at 1.7:209; MODERN LEGAL ETmcs, supra note 1, § 7.3.2.
Notwithstanding the long and unquestioned line of decisions prohibiting engaging in litigation with
one's own client, Professor Thomas D. Morgan has questioned its rationale and argued for
exceptions to the rule. See Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a Current Client, 9 GEO. J. LEO. Emcs 1157
(1996). For a somewhat mild response, see Brian J. Redding, Suing a Current Client: A Response to
Professor Morgan, 10 GEO. J. LEG. ETmcs 487 (1997).
182. Both the colloquial and more elegant usages are referred to in the opinion of Judge Stewart
Dalzell in In re Lisa Lambert, 962 F. Supp. 1521, 1546 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (mentioning my expert
testimony to the effect that prosecutor's direct telephone call to expert witness retained by defense
counsel to discuss experts testimony was a "no brainer" or, as Judge Dalzell more elegantly put it,
"the sort of thing that is just not done"), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 1998).
183. For example, in Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Anixter Bros., Inc., No. C-1-93-0871, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21012, at *9 (S.D. Ohio, June 27, 1994), the court met an argument that suing a sister
corporation was not adverse to a corporate client with the following dismissive observation: ". . . We
cannot imagine how an attorney can maintain a duty of undivided loyalty to a [corporate] client,
while at the same time zealously attempting to exact millions of dollars of damages from a sister
corporation .... Id.
The example in the text purposefully stops short of positing an economic threat so dire that it
threatens the very existence of the subsidiary. While that situation is not mentioned in the majority
opinion in ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, from anything stated there it would appear that the
majority's same "indirect" analysis would, preposterously enough, apply.
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majority, we apparently are to believe that the suit would not be such a
direct attack. This apparently flows from the fact that two sets of entries
on the books of two different entities-the subsidiary and the parent-
would be necessary before the impact would be "felt" by the parent.
Extending the same reasoning, a judgment against a client would not be
"adverse" because the client would first have to write a check to pay it.
But it is entirely unclear why bookkeeping arrangements should even be
noticed in making the directly-adverse assessment under Rule 1.7(a),
much less exalted over economic reality. The question is whether the
financial impact on a reasonable client would cause justifiable outrage
and thereby impair the relationship, not the number of bookkeeping
entries an accountant would customarily make in toting up the injury.
Finally, the "process" argument of the ABA majority's position-
that its "bright" line was necessary because no other principled line could
be drawn 84-ignores what has been the ABA committee's own pre-
ferred way of dealing with line-drawing issues under the Model Rules.
Instead, of narrowly construing a rule, the committee-elsewhere, both
in other of its opinions and in another portion of ABA Formal Opinion
95-390 itselfl 8-has favored a "factors" analysis, setting out considera-
tions that guide whether a rule applies in particular circumstances. As
will be seen below, the same sort of approach to assessing whether a
conflict exists in a lawyer's representation adverse to a corporate affiliate
would provide an appropriate process for deciding those questions.
(iii) Impaired-Representation Considerations in Corporate-
Family Conflicts
ABA Model Rule 1.7(b)"' states a basis for finding a concurrent-
representation objection that is complementary to, but independent of,187
the "directly adverse" ground stated in Rule 1.7(a). The ground stated in
Rule 1.7(b) concerns conflicts caused by the risk that the lawyer's repre-
sentation of a client will be materially limited because of, among other
184. See ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 13; see also text accompanying note 177.
185. See ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 8 ("...[W]hen a lawyer is considering
whether he can assume the representation adverse to a corporate client, he must consider not merely
the terms of his engagement to that client but in addition whether the circumstances are such that the
affiliate has reason to believe, on the basis of the nature of the lawyer's dealings with it, that it has a
client-lawyer relationship with the lawyer."). Id
186. See text accompanying notes 165-66.
187. In other words, satisfaction of the standard of Rule 1.7(a) does not necessarily absolve a
lawyer of a charge of a concurrent-representation conflict. The lawyer must also satisfy whatever
additional requirements are imposed by Rule 1.7(b). See generally Wolfram, Parts and Wholes,
supra note 166, at 887.
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adverse influences, "the lawyer's responsibilities to another client . .. ."
The intended reach of that sort of conflict is usefully described in the
comment to the rule. 188 As is now well-established, the rule deals with
probabilities, not certainties, that a representation will be impaired. Thus,
a lawyer's protest that, despite her apparently compromised set of repre-
sentations, she will take or took steps to ensure that neither client suf-
fered harm does nothing to remove the conflict (unless both clients agree
by consenting after consultation). Similarly, it is erroneous to assume
that the lawyer's compromised position must cause the client actual
adverse impact for a conflict to exist. It is enough to create a conflict if
entering into representations creates the substantial risk of material
impairment of the lawyer's ability to exercise independent professional
judgment on behalf of the clients.' 89 All the conflict rules are prophylac-
tic in that way, prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a risky represen-
tation (or other relationship) without any additional requirement of proof
of actual injury or prejudice to the client.' 9°
As applied to corporate-family conflicts, Rule 1.7(b) assesses
whether the lawyer's representation of another client adverse to a corpo-
rate affiliate may materially limit the lawyer's representation of either.
The majority in ABA Formal Opinion 95-390 is probably correct in its
apparent surmise that the client most likely to be at risk is the new client
because of the lawyer's temptation to avoid taking strong action against
the corporate affiliate for fear of arousing the ire of the lawyer's corpo-
rate client. 191 Yet in many such situations, there may be the correlative
risk that the lawyer (or another lawyer in her firm) will, in representing
188. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 1, at 1.7 cmt. [4]:
Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry
out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other
responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would
otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (b) addresses such situations. A possible
conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood
that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the
lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose
courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client....
Id.
189. See generally PROPOSED FiNAL RESTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 201 (conflict exists "if
there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and
adversely affected by ... the lawyer's duties to another current client [or] a former client").
190. Of course, a damage remedy will often require such proof. The text refers only to proof of
a violation of the lawyer's duty.
191. See ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 14. Despite its earlier recognition that "the
lawyer must consider the effect of the simultaneous representation of the two clients on each of
them," (id at 5 (emphasis supplied)) the committee's later analysis of Rule 1.7(b) only mentions
possible effects on the lawyer's representation of the new client. See id. at 14-15.
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the new client, over-compensate by taking overly-aggressive action
against the corporate affiliate, to prove that the lawyer is independent of
influence of the corporate client. 192 We are also assuming that the new
client in fact is "new," but it could often occur that this is simply a long-
standing firm client whose affairs have come into conflict with those of
another firm lawyer. In all events, it appears that the constraints of Rule
1.7(b), as a factual matter, will be less often relevant to corporate-family
conflicts issues than the adversity standard of Rule 1.7(a).
c. The Confidentiality Prohibition Against Substantially-Related
Representations
Even most otherwise hard-line no-affiliates commentators and
judges quail at the thought of permitting a lawyer representing a parent to
sue a subsidiary if the matter is factually linked to work that the lawyer
was doing or had done for the parent.' 93 Acceptance of a confidentiality
exception obviously narrows the ground to an extent between the other-
wise divergent theories. It is also intuitively appealing. The most obvious
danger, of course, (there are others as well) is that use of the client corpo-
ration's confidential information against the interests of the affiliated
entity works to the disadvantage of the client corporation itself, which is
prohibited.' 94 Also objectionable, but for reasons that are somewhat
more complex, would be for a lawyer to put herself in the position of
being able to use against an affiliate confidential information about the
affiliate that the lawyer learned in the course of representing another
member of the corporate family. That, too, has been held
impermissible. 95
192. On one variant of the over-reaction problem, see Wolfram, Former Client Conflicts, supra
note 9, at 700-01.
193. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 102, at 661 note 16, 669-74. A confidentiality exception is
also recognized in both of the lawyer codes that presently deal with corporate-family conflicts
issues. See, e.g., D. C. Rule 1.7 cmt., quoted in Appendix, infra; Florida Rule 1.13 cmt., quoted
supra note 24.
The California authorities, see supra text accompanying notes 132-41, with their insistence that
only a rigorously-applied alter ego exception is available, may be an exception to this. On the other
hand, no California authority explicitly rejects such an exception, and no California case has yet
presented facts calling for decision on the point.
194. See MODEL RuLns, supra note 1, at Rule 1.6(a); See also MODEL Ruu s, supra note 1, at
Rule 1.9(c)(1) (prohibition against adverse "use" of former client's confidential information); ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(B)(2) (1969) (lawyer may not "use a
confidence or secret of a client for the advantage of the lawyer or a third person"). Id.
195. Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7 Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 955 (1978) (even if member of trade association was not client of law firm, information
learned in confidence from member in course of law firm's work for association formed adequate
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But conceding a confidentiality exception, as does the majority in
ABA Formal Opinion 95-390,196 presents an analytical anomaly for the
no-affiliates position, a problem that is customarily unexamined. The
problem, fairly obviously, is that the latter representation is, at least in
the standard understanding of the no-affiliates adherents, not "directly
adverse" to the parent. 197 How, then, can it be said that adverse use
against the subsidiary violates a duty owed to the parent? It is only by
recognizing some community of interests, or, if different, the right of the
one affiliate to invoke the confidentiality interests of the other, that a no-
affiliates adherent can bridge the entity gap in order to accomplish what
transparently needs to be done.
d. Illegitimate Considerations in the Corporate-Family Conflict
Debate
The foregoing are the major components of the argument of those
authorities that favor a version of the no-affiliates position. Each, in my
view, is seriously flawed, either internally or in the context of the posi-
tion involved. Remaining for consideration in this brief survey are a
number of other arguments or positions that have been taken by those
questioning whether corporate-family conflicts should be a very robust
category.
(i) Asking the Wrong Question: "Alter Ego" Entities
Both the majority in ABA Formal Opinion 95-390 and the Califor-
nia authorities seem to agree in recognizing an explicit exception for
affiliates so closely related to the lawyer's corporate client that one is the
alter ego of the other.198 The exception is acknowledged in other ethics
committee opinions and court decisions.' 99 The concept behind the
exception is borrowed from the general law of corporations, under which
a parent corporation may in stated conditions be held liable for the obli-
basis for finding of impermissible substantial relationship between earlier representation and present
representation by firm against member).
196. ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 10; see also supra text accompanying note 147.
197. See, e.g., ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 11-13.
198. See ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 10; Cal. Formal Op. 1989-113, supra note
134. The alter ego exception may be quite different under the two approaches. In Apex Oil Co. v.
Wickland Oil Co., No. CIV-S-94-1499-DFL-GGH, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6398, at *9 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 28, 1995), the court rejected the approach of the ABA Formal Opinion as unduly broad, and
insisted on its own, narrower conception of the exception.
199. See, e.g., Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Sprint Pub. & Advertising, Inc., No. 95 C 5825,
1996 WL 99902, at *3 (N.D. II., Feb. 29, 1996) (recognizing exception, but refusing to find it
applicable on facts); 111. St. B. Ass'n, Opin. No. 95-15, 1996 WL 478489, at *3 (May 17, 1996)
(accepting alter ego exception, citing ABA Opinion 95-390 and Calif. Op. 1989-113).
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gations of a subsidiary-despite their formal corporate separateness and
despite the law of limited liability for shareholders. Under that body of
law, the alter ego relationship will be found if the creditor seeking to
pierce the corporate veil carries the heavy evidentiary burden of demon-
strating that, among other things, the capitalization of the subsidiary is
unreasonably small, given the risks of the line of business in which the
subsidiary operates.2 '0 Despite its surface appearance of an analogous fit,
on further reflection the alter ego exception makes little sense in the cor-
porate-family context. As a conflict of interest concept, it has been
wrenched into only a formlessly vague analog to its corporate-law
original.
When transported out of the field of corporate liability into the
question of corporate-family conflicts, the alter ego notion suffers from
at least three serious defects. First, the alter ego concept in its origins is a
liability rule to guard against corporate fraud or other shenanigans, under
which a court will "disregard the entity when its separateness is used for
illegitimate purposes."2 °1 Aside from loose and irrelevant usage of the
rhetoric of veil piercing, 0 whether corporations are sufficiently related
to require disqualification of a lawyer has nothing to do with the reasons
for extending liability of one corporation for the debts of another.
Wrenching the alter ego notion out of the fraud-prevention context for
purposes of determining whether a client-lawyer conflict exists risks seri-
ous distortion. Here, the corporation asserting conflict would be bur-
dened by the potentially ruinous, or at least embarrassing, consequences
of arguing that it has not observed corporation formalities and has an
under-capitalized subsidiary. Imposing the risk of such obviously serious
consequences for a corporate client seems grotesque when the question
posed is the degree of loyalty to a current corporate client. It may also
provide a strong disincentive so that most corporate clients, for self-pro-
tective reasons, will make that assertion only about desk-drawer
affiliates. °3
200. See generally HENN & AL .ANDER, supra note 36, at § 148, at 355-56 (3d ed. 1983)
(separate corporate existence will be observed unless: (1) transactions, property, employees, and
bank accounts are intermingled; (2) separate formalities are not observed; (3) subsidiary corporations
is inadequately capitalized in view of its reasonably foreseeable financial needs; (4) corporations are
not held out to public as separate; and (5) policies of the subsidiary are directed by the parent);
LARRY E. Rmsr'ErN & PEmR V. LErsON, Busnass ASSOCIATIONS § 3.05[E] (3d ed. 1996) (similar).
201. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CoRN,.u L.
REv. 1036, 1041 (1991).
202. The "pierce the corporate veil" rhetoric is commonly found in arguments for a narrow rule
of corporate-family conflicts. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 102, at 655.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. The corporate client's concern, obviously, is
that making the argument on a public record that a corporate affiliate is merely an alter ego of the
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A second problem is that, in the original setting of the alter ego
concept as a liability rule, courts have traditionally been quite reluctant to
accept a finding of alter ego status, on the rationale that the doctrine is an
attack on the fundamental concept of limited corporate liability.2" Thus,
in standard applications of the alter ego theory, a creditor asserting the
lack of separateness must satisfy a strict burden of proof, meaning that
the doctrine is not often successfully invoked.2 °5 In the entirely different
context of corporate-family conflicts, however, there is no similar con-
sideration urging restraint, for limited corporate liability is not the ques-
tion directly posed. Indeed, general fiduciary considerations would
suggest that the doctrine, quite uncharacteristically, be applied
generously.
A third distortion is that the alter ego notion applies in the corpo-
rate-family conflicts field, not only to determine when representation of a
parent extends to a subsidiary, but also when representation of a brother
corporation extends to a sister entity. But veil piercing between brother-
sister corporations, although theoretically possible, is hardly ever seen in
general corporate law because of the absence in most brother-sister
instances of financial dependency of the one on the other (as opposed to
such dependency by one or both on their common parent).2"
Because the alter ego concept is a vaguely familiar one and the veil-
piercing metaphor has an almost colloquial ring, the language of alter
ego is frequently used in discussions of corporate-family conflicts to
express what is sometimes referred to, as if it were a unitary exception to
the no-affiliates position. In fact, however, the alter ego notion has
become almost formlessly elastic. California, at one extreme, apparently
means the literally same exception as begrudgingly recognized in corpo-
rate law2 07-a usage which is unintelligible for conflicts purposes. As
client can be used as very persuasive evidence against the client by creditors in future litigation when
attempting to pierce the corporate veil.
204. See, e.g., Walkovszsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 10 (N.Y. 1966); STEPHEN P. PRassEa,
PIERCING a Com'ORArE VEn (1991); Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEx. L. REv.
979, 982-83 (1971).
205. See supra text accompanying note 200.
206. Cf HENN & ALExAxDR, supra note 36, at 356 (3d ed. 1983) (listing as separate test for
veil-piercing whether "ftihe corporation is inadequately financed as a separate unit from the point of
view of meeting its normal obligations foreseeable in a business of its size and character, because of
either initial inadequate financing or having its earnings drained off so as to keep it in a condition of
financial dependency."). Id.
207. Apex Oil Co. v. Wickland Oil Co., CIV-S-94-1499-DFL-GGH, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6398, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal., Feb. 28, 1995); Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners v. Superior
Court, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Cal. St. B. Standing Comm. on Prof.
Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1989-113, 1989 WL 253261 at *5 (1989).
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used in ABA Formal Opinion 95-390, however, the exception is signifi-
cantly broader. In fact the opinion states that "[i]t is not necessary... for
one corporation to be the alter ego of the other as a matter of law in order
for both to be considered clients .... ,2o8 At a still-more-distant remove,
the District of Columbia lawyer code exception uses the term alter ego
even more loosely, referring to a large collection of exceptions-most of
which would be unintelligible under the general (and strict) corporate-
law rules about veil-piercing. 2" Those broader exceptions, while quite
intelligible and defensible on other terms,21° makes little sense under the
law of alter ego. As is so often the case with general labels in the law,
here also the nomenclature of alter ego can readily obscure much more
than it illuminates. There are good reasons for holding that a lawyer who
represents one corporation will, under some conditions, be held to have
client-like obligations to an affiliate, but alter ego is not one of them.
(ii) The False Allure of Estoppel Considerations
Arguments in support of the no-affiliates approach frequently
invoke various arguments that, when not blatantly ad hominem, are at
least highly suspicious of the motives of corporations, that might object
to conflicts based on their law firm's representation of an affiliated
entity. Most such arguments rather painfully beg the question. Thus, one
form of estoppel argument is that a corporation that has "elected" to set
up a complex corporate structure should bear the burdens of such a struc-
ture as well as the benefits of such arrangements. 21' The force of such
arguments, if not their wording, is that the burdens are in some way
deserved because the corporation enjoys benefits of multiple-entity struc-
ture. But why should we suppose that one specified burden that flows
from adoption of a multiple-entity arrangement is rejection of a conflicts
208. See ABA Opin. 95-390, supra note 143, at 10. The majority added that ". . .A disregard of
corporate formalities and/or a complete identity of managements and boards of directors could call
for treating the two corporations as one .... The fact that the corporate client wholly owns or is
wholly owned by, its affiliate does not in itself make them alter egos. However, whole ownership
may well entail not merely a shared legal department but a management so intertwined that all
members of the corporate family effectively operate as a single entity; and in those circumstances
representing one member of the family may effectively mean representing all the others as well ......
Id at 10-11. On the "shared legal department" point, see infta text accompanying notes 254-57.
The ABA's expansive concept of alter ego is explicitly borrowed from Teradyne, Inc. v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C-91-0344 MHP ENE, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8363 (N.D. Cal. June 6,
1991). Since the Teradyne decision, a California intermediate appellate court has insisted on a much
narrower concept of alter ego. See Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners v. Superior Court, 70
Cal. Rptr. 2d 419, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
209. See infra text accompanying note 257.
210. See infra text accompanying notes 254-57.
211. See Rotunda, supra note 102, at 681.
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objection? That, plainly, is the question, not the answer. Moreover, the
argument assumes some kind of proportionality between the burden and
benefits, which may be counter-factual.
2 12
(iii) The Possibility of Ex Ante Arrangements
The majority opinion in the ABA's Formal Opinion 95-390 obvi-
ously gained some comfort from the fact that some corporate clients
were sufficiently sophisticated that, if they hold to a concept of corporate
loyalty more generous to the corporation than that reflected in the opin-
ion, they would be free to heighten the lawyer's duties through agree-
ment.213 While that may be a comfort to throw to sophisticated corporate
clients who enjoy significant leverage in bargaining with their lawyers, it
introduces a potentially dangerous precedent-at that one that seems
entirely inconsistent with the position that the ABA ethics committee
took only a year earlier. In its earlier opinion, the committee held that a
retainer agreement with a client in which the lawyer agreed not to sue the
client in the future, even on a matter unrelated to the lawyer's representa-
tion, was impermissible.2" 4 The decision was placed on the broad ground
that such an agreement "would impermissibly restrain a lawyer from
engaging in his profession."2 5 But such an agreement, of course, is what
the majority opinion in ABA Formal Opinion 95-390 proposes to legiti-
mate, indeed welcome.
Talk of the power of a corporate client to expand a lawyer's respon-
sibilities by agreements at the outset of the representation is dangerous
for another reason. It may create the impression that clients themselves
are in some important measure responsible for detecting conflict situa-
tions, initiating discussions about conflicts and, possibly, obtaining a
lawyer's agreement to abide by negotiated conflicts standards. Such a
view, of course, stands on its head the role of consensual arrangements in
212. A plain example would be the "desk-drawer" subsidiary. See supra this article, at page
304.
213. ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 2 & 7-8; Cf id. at 15-16 (obtaining advance
corporate client consent to proceed adversely to represented affiliate). On the legitimacy of the latter
use of client-lawyer agreements to limit what would otherwise be the reach of conflicts law,
particularly where the client is sophisticated and independently represented on the question of
consent, see generally PROPOSED FrNAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 202 cmt. (d); ABA Opinion,
supra note 143, at 93-372.
214. ABA Formal Opin. 94-381 (1994).
215. See id. at 3. The opinion could argue only by analogy from rules such as ABA Model Rule
5.6(a) (1983), which prohibits agreements restricting a lawyer's right to practice law, but only when
made in "a partnership or employment agreement," and Rule 5.6(b), which prohibits such
agreements made as an aspect of settling a case.
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conflicts law.216 The persistent position of the ABA ethics committee
and of many judicial decisions is that the lawyer, not the client, bears the
burden of spotting conflicts and initiating discussions about consent.217
Indeed, the majority in ABA Formal Opinion 95-390 went out of its way
to offer the strong advice that lawyers who represented one member of a
corporate family initiate a discussion whenever there was any room for
doubt, either about the facts21 8 or about the lawyer's own assessment that
no conflict existed.21 9
(iv) Chaos and Complexity
Arguments in support of the no-affiliates approach sometimes
express impatience with the "complex, ever-changing and bewildering
organization chart" presented by multiple-entity organizations, "using an
impenetrable fog of subsidiaries and affiliates when it appears advanta-
geous to do so . "..."220 First, one must set aside the "ever-changing"
objection, which will be considered at a later point. For the present, sim-
ply note that the issue of transformations within the corporate family is
discrete, with a discrete solution-and one that does not burden law
firms.221 Second, with respect to the objection of complexity, it surely
has bite-but hardly always and rarely incurably so. Complexity, as with
much else, can be relative. A parent corporation with but one affiliate, a
216. A similar observation may be made about the majority's repeated statement that the client
cure what the client regards as an objectionable concurrent-representation conflict by firing the
lawyer. Id. at 13 ("the client's only recourse is to fire the lawyer who undertakes a matter that
displeases the client"). Id. at 15 note 14 (after noting remedy of disqualification where conflict exists
in litigation, "[w]here disqualification is not available, of course, a client can simply choose to
discharge counsel."). The perhaps blithe assumption that such a course of action would be costless
to the client is, of course, often erroneous.
217. See MoDEL RuLEs, supra note 1, at 1.7 cmt. [1] (as amended February 17, 1987) ... The
lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to
determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters, the parties and issues involved and to
determine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest."); see also IBM Corp. v. Levin,
579 F.2d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 1978); Glidden Co. v. Jandemoa, 173 F.R.D. 459, 480 (W.D. Mich.
1997) ". . . Where dual representation creates a conflict of interest, the burden is on the attorney
involved to approach both clients with an affirmative disclosure and a request for express
consent.... This burden is not met by arguing that the party to whom the duty was owed had
constructive knowledge of the conflict .... ); ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 2 ("the onus
is squarely on the lawyer to anticipate and resolve conflicts of interest involving corporate
affiliates").
218. ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 15.
219. See id.
220. Rotunda, supra note 102, at 681; Cf ABA Formal Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 2
(noting that corporate-family problems may arise "because there is a change in the identity of the
client, through acquisition, mergers and the like").
221. See infra text accompanying notes 262-68.
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wholly-owned subsidiary, can hardly be accused of fomenting complex-
ity. On the other hand, a corporation with hundreds of affiliates well
might present a problem of significant difficulty to any law firm that in
good faith attempts to comply with any but a no-affiliates rule. As
throughout these realms, the highly variable facts should and do matter.
A companion objection to any but a no-affiliates rule is that law
firms would otherwise be obliged to keep track of the ever-changing cor-
porate family members of a client-member of such a family.22 (Again,
with respect to the impact of merger and similar activity of a client, most
courts seem prepared to apply a different rule than the one implied by the
complaint.)223 Depending on the client,224 the burdens on a law firm of
conflict-checking could be substantial. (Of course, for that reason, law
firms with such clients will be impelled to condition representation in
minor matters on the client's willingness to waive what otherwise may
be corporate-family conflicts.) 225 But the task is hardly undoable. If the
question is the identity of all corporate-family members, that information
can be readily obtained from the client. Failing or instead of that, refer-
ence publications contain the necessary data about corporations of signif-
icant size. 226 Once the names of all corporate-family members are
inputted into the law firm's conflicts-checking data bank, there will be
additional work involved. Conflicts-checking inevitably involves a fair
amount of non-mechanical work. At least with respect to corporate-fam-
ily members of significant size (members of inconsequential size are,
obviously, correspondingly less likely to create conflicts problems), there
will presumably be computer "hits" in checking new clients or new mat-
ters for old clients. Under any version of the corporate-family conflicts
rule-including that of California, the most generous to law firms-it
will be necessary for a lawyer to examine the facts involving the new
matter and, with respect to the "hit" affiliate, make a factual determina-
tion whether the company is at least an alter ego of the firm's client or
for some other reason is so situated as to create a conflict with the new
client. The only difference between the no-affiliates and all-affiliates
222. See, e.g. ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 8 ("[O]utside lawyers who are
performing only a limited role for a single aspect of the business [of an affiliate of a corporate
family], no matter how well-intentioned, should not be expected to be current on all of the names,
relationships and ownership interests among a client's varied and sometimes far-flung business
interests..."). Id. See also Rotunda, supra note 102, at 656.
223. See infra text accompanying notes 262-68.
224. On the large numbers of entities in some corporate families, see supra text accompanying
notes 32-33.
225. See supra text accompany notes 213-19. See also infra text accompanying notes 269-70.
226. See Dms & BRADSTRFr, supra note 32.
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tests is that the latter gives definite and quick answers, while the former
requires more elaborate examination,227 as will be true of any test other
than the all-affiliates standard. Thus, complaints about the difficulty that
a law firm might experience in administering an alternative test should
be carefully assessed on a comparative basis. Unless the alternative is
either the extreme version of the all-affiliates or no-affiliates positions,
all tests (which includes all tests applied by most decisions and adopted
in ethics committee opinions) recognize important exceptions that are
recurring, fact-intensive and impossible to administer through a com-
puter or a non-lawyer assistant operating a conflicts-checking system.
(4) Lateral-Dimension Conflicts-A Functional Approach
Drawing on the foregoing, it can by this point be seen that a theory
other than the absolutes of the all-affiliates or no-affiliates positions is
both desirable and available. An appropriate approach should avoid the
irrelevant distractions of the alter ego inquiry,228 and should aim to sat-
isfy the legitimate demands of corporate-family clients for loyalty 229 and
confidentiality.23° That better mousetrap has already been constructed,
for the most part, in the new comments in the Rules of Professional Con-
duct of the District of Columbia,231 although it, too, could be improved.
In the analysis that follows, attention will be drawn to the D.C. com-
ments, but the discussion generally is consistent with and fulfils the
requirements of the existing lawyer code rules now in force in other
jurisdictions as well.
It is important to note that in the discussion that follows, we deal
with the difficult cases-those in which there is no sufficient basis on
which the affiliate to a corporate client can be said to be a direct client of
the lawyer or law firm in question. That may assume a great deal, for in
appropriate circumstances, a lawyer-as the result of work being done
for the corporate client-may enter into a direct client-lawyer relation-
ship with affiliates. The ways in which that may occur have already been
examined.232 In the discussion that follows, then, we assume that there
227. As noted by the majority in ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 15, the law firm is
responsible for knowing accurately the facts necessary to make an alter ego assessment, or any other
assessment that might create a conflict, a responsibility that in most instances a firm would be well-
advised to fulfil by making inquiry of its corporate client. See also supra text accompanying notes
217-19.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 198-210.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 160-92.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 193-97.
231. The relevant District of Columbia comments are reprinted in the Appendix.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
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are insufficient facts indicating such a direct client-lawyer relationship
with the affiliate.
(a) Confidentiality for Corporate Clients and Affiliates
Perhaps the one area on which agreement seems rampant (at least
outside California2 33 ) with respect to corporate-family conflicts is that
involving the protection of confidentiality.234 Even here, however, analy-
sis has occasionally been less than satisfactory. The problems will be
pursued below with respect to both concurrent-representation situations
and those involving former clients. Pursuing the latter inquiry will pro-
vide an occasion for assessing how corporate-family conflicts issues
should be determined in former-client settings in general.
(i) Concurrent-Representation Situations
As is conventional, we here assume that the question of conflict
arises because the lawyer or law firm has undertaken to represent at the
same time235 both a corporation and, in a factually-related matter,
another client who is adverse to an affiliate of the corporate client. No
decision or ethics committee opinion has expressly permitted such a rep-
resentation, and several authorities have condemned them. In analyzing
why that result is required, it is useful to separate out situations in which
the confidentiality interests of the immediate client and then of the affili-
ate are at stake.
(1) When a present corporate client provides confidential informa-
tion to a lawyer, the client clearly is entitled to protection against the risk
that the lawyer will use the information in a way that threatens important
interests of the client. The standard lawyer code formulations prohibit a
lawyer from revealing confidential information about a client against the
interests of the client.236 While the 1983 ABA Model Rules formulation
is limited to a prohibition against "reveal[ing]" such information, courts
have not hesitated to construe the rule as if it prohibited adverse "use" of
233. See supra text accompanying notes 132-41; Cf text accompanying note 193.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 193-97.
235. For sometimes-tricky determinations of when a representation is still ongoing for the
purpose of imposing the more-exacting requirements of the concurrent-representation rules, see
Wolfram, Former-Client Conflicts, supra note 9, at 703-06.
236. See MODEL RULs, supra note 1, at 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating
to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation..."). The former ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility was clearer on the point. See MODEL CODE, supra note
1, at 4-101(B)(l)-(3) (1969) (except with client consent, "a lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) [rleveal
a confidence of secret of his client[;] (2) [u]se a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage
of the client[; or] (3) [u]se a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of . a third
person"). Id.
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such information as well. They have done this by creating an analog to
the Rule 1.9 prohibition against former-client conflicts, 237 by employing
the "substantial relationship" formulation stated in that rule to test con-
current-representation situations in which there is a claim that the lawyer
is in a position in which the client's confidential information is at risk of
adverse use. 2 38 Because the situation involves a current client, those
decisions are, if anything, even more demanding than former-client cases
(in which the only interest to protect is the former client's reasonable
expectation in confidentiality, and not any other interest in loyalty).23 9
The clearest illustration of that is the willingness of courts to accept that
the lawyer's work for the other client against the interest of a (mere)
affiliate of her other, corporate client is "adverse" to the corporate client.
While some findings of adverseness could rest on the fact that the corpo-
rate client's material financial interest in the affiliate is at risk because of
the lawyer's work, even in the absence of such an impact, the linkage of
substantial relationship (together with adverseness to the affiliate) suf-
fices to create a duty that the lawyer not undertake the representation.
(2) Suppose, however, that the information to which the lawyer has
been exposed is not that of the lawyer's own client, but is that of the
corporate affiliate? That shifts the source of the right to claim confidenti-
ality to an organization that we are assuming has no direct client-lawyer
relationship with the lawyer. Does that shift remove the basis for
objecting to the adverse representation of the other client? It does not,
but for somewhat different reasons. Here, by hypothesis, the lawyer's
own corporate client cannot claim an interest in confidentiality of infor-
mation that it had directly provided to the lawyer. In the strict sense of
entitlement that we are entertaining, "its" information is not at risk.24°
But it has an additional claim that precludes the lawyer's adverse repre-
237. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 1, at 1.9(a)("[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a
client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client
unless the former client consents after consultation."). l.
238. Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 270 (D. Del. 1980); see also Brooklyn
Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. PMNC, 663 N.Y. Supp. 2d 499, 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997);
D.C. Comment, Appendix, infra I [14(b)] (representation of additional client prohibited if lawyer
has acquired confidential information of "the organization client").
239. On this perhaps-controversial point, see Wolfram, Former-Client Conflicts, supra note 9,
at 691-712.
240. The corporate client could claim that the affiliate's confidential information is "its"
information, even though provided to the lawyer by the affiliate-on the observation that adverse
use against the affiliate would have consequential adverse financial impact on the client. But that is
an observation about economic impact, not about confidentiality. On such impacts, see infra text
accompanying notes 250-53.
HeinOnline -- 2 J. Inst. for Study Legal Ethics 354 1999
CORPORATE-FAMILY CONFLICTS
sentation. Courts have permitted the affiliate to make a derivative claim
of confidentiality,24 1 on the notion that the lawyer has an implied duty of
confidentiality to an affiliate of the lawyer's client from whom, in the
course and as a direct result of representing the client, the lawyer learns
confidential information.242 The notion is not that the lawyer necessarily
owes all of the customary client-lawyer fiduciary obligations to the non-
client about whom the lawyer learned confidential information. It is the
more limited notion that an entity that provides confidential information
to a lawyer on the understanding that it will be used for the benefit of an
affiliate (the direct client of the lawyer) reasonably believes that the
information will not later be employed to the material disadvantage of
the entity. In situations where the two representations (the one of the
corporate affiliate and the other the assertedly conflicted representation
adverse to the non-client entity) are ongoing, the objection would be that
the willingness of the non-client entity to provide confidential informa-
tion to the lawyer would, for obvious reasons, be seriously compromised
by the lawyer's undertaking of the adverse representation of the client
with the factually-related matter.
(ii) Former-Client Situations
Assume that the lawyer's representation of her corporate client has
come to an end. May the lawyer, after a decent interval has occurred,24 3
commence the representation of another client against an affiliate of the
former client if the new matter is substantially related to the former mat-
ter? Here, too, courts have generously protected reasonable expectations
241. D.C. Comment, Appendix, infra I [14(b)] (representation of additional client prohibited if
lawyer has acquired confidential information of corporate client "or an affiliate or constituent" of
that client).
242. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7"' Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978) (protecting confidentiality interest of affiliate on similar facts). For
analogous protection of non-clients under the substantial-relationship formulation employed in
former-"client" situations, see PROPOSED FinAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 213 cmt. (g)(i)
("person about whom lawyer learned confidential information while representing former client").
The D.C. Comment, Appendix, infra [14], apparently proceeds on a different, and
unsatisfactory concept that the lawyer is "deemed" to represent the affiliate, or (apparently
alternatively) that there is an "implied" client-lawyer relationship with the affiliate. But the comment
goes on to insist that propriety of the questioned representation "must also be tested by reference to
the lawyer's obligations" to preserve the confidentiality of information of both the corporate client
and the affiliate. An alternative reading of the comment is that it refers to different situations-one
in which an implied-in-fact representation of the affiliate is warranted in the circumstances and the
other in which no such client-lawyer relationship exists but where a duty of confidentiality
(otherwise unexplained) nonetheless exists.
243. On decisions in effect requiring such an interval, see Wolfram, Former-Client Conflicts,
supra note 9, at 703-08 ("sunset" concept in assessing when concurrent representation has become a
former-client representation).
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in the confidentiality of information on the part of both the original cor-
porate client and its then affiliates. As with concurrent-representation
analogs, the few decisions dealing with the issue in the context of a cor-
porate family have rooted a prohibition against the later representation on
the grounds of confidentiality. 2 Again in agreement with concurrent-
representation analogs, the duty of the lawyer to avoid such conflicted
representations applies whether the lawyer is likely to have learned the
linking confidential information in the earlier representation from either
the corporate client245 or from the non-client affiliate.2"6
While the foregoing places important conflict limitations on the
right of a lawyer to represent an adverse client, it is important to note that
protection of confidentiality exhausts the duties of a lawyer to any for-
mer client, and certainly to a non-client to whom the lawyer owes confi-
dentiality duties.24 7 In other words, no matter how adverse the later
representation may be, if it is not also factually linked to the earlier rep-
resentation in the way required under the substantial-relationship stan-
dard, the later representation is permissible.24 Recalling, again, that
courts are diligent in protecting the reasonable confidentiality expecta-
244. See, e.g., Baxter Diagnostics, Inc. v. AVL Scientific Corp., 798 F. Supp. 612, 615-16
(C.D. Cal. 1992) (confidentiality interests preclude law firm that had formerly advised predecessor
of parent corporation on same matter from representing party suing parent's subsidiary); Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (in absence of
substantial relationship between firm's earlier representation of subsidiary in product-liability
litigation and firm's later representation adverse to parent corporation in litigation over leveraged
buyout, no conflict, although involvement of parent's general counsel in earlier litigation in
supervisory role would require disqualification if substantial relationship shown); Cf G.F. Indus.,
Inc. v. American Brands, Inc., 583 A.2d 765, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (confidentiality as
basis for decision precluding lawyers who formerly represented subsidiary in course of representing
parent from later representing parent in suit by subsidiary and its new parent contesting conditions of
sale of subsidiary).
245. See supra text of note 195.
246. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., supra note 242; see also PIRo'oSED
FiNAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 201 cmt. (d), illustration 10 (based on facts in Kerr-McGee
decision and agreeing with result).
247. The 1996 District of Columbia amendments, Appendix, infra, are defective in failing to
identify the very limited extent to which they might apply for former-client conflict questions
involving corporate family members. Placement of the new material in the comments to the rule on
current-client conflicts will probably serve to limit their operation, leaving open the question of
former-client conflicts. Both in the District and elsewhere, former-client conflict questions should be
resolved as suggested in the text.
248. See, e.g., McKane v. City of Lansing, 861 F. Supp. 47, 49 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (in view of
factual differences between earlier and subsequent representations, disqualification motion against
former counsel denied); Brice v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 769 F. Supp. 193, 196-97 (D.V.I.
1990) (similar); Madison v. Graffix Fabrix, Inc., 404 S.E.2d 37, 40 (S.C. Ct. Apps. 1991) (similar);
Universal Servs. Co. v. Ung, 882 S.W.2d 460, 468 (Tex. Ct. Apps. 1994) (similar); see generally
Wolfram, Former Client Conflicts, supra note 9, at 687-88.
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tions of either or both of the original corporate client and its affiliate, it
can thus be seen that other considerations in the corporate-family con-
flicts debate are irrelevant in the context of a former-client question. For
example, in a jurisdiction that recognizes the alter ego basis for
extending conflicts duties to a lawyer's representation adverse to a cor-
porate affiliate, the fact that (non-client) Corporation S is found to be the
alter ego of Corporation C, the former client, this should not be recog-
nized as a sufficient basis for finding an impermissible former-client con-
flict. Similarly, the fact that, on a realistic appraisal, the lawyer's adverse
representation against the corporate affiliate will cause substantial finan-
cial harm to the former corporate client249 is also irrelevant, again, in the
absence of a substantial relationship between the two matters. In all
cases, there must also be a sufficient finding of factual linkage through
application of the substantial-relationship standard.
(b) Loyalty and Corporate-Family Conflicts
As a concept considered independently of confidentiality, loyalty is
operative primarily in the area of concurrent-representation conflicts. It is
within that area that it has played its most important, and most controver-
sial, role in corporate-family conflicts. The question in general terms is
the extent to which a lawyer's obligations of loyalty to a present corpo-
rate client precludes the lawyer from accepting representation of another
client in a matter adverse to an affiliate of the corporate client. To my
mind, the most appropriate way to answer that fundamental question is
by paying close attention to the possible negative impacts on the corpo-
rate client that such a representation may entail. When a substantial
impact of that kind is threatened, the adverse representation should be
precluded. When it is not, the representation should be permitted to pro-
ceed, and without the consent of either the corporate client or the
affiliate.
(i) Loyalty and Material Financial Impacts
The most obvious negative impact on a corporate client is the sort of
financial hit to the client's financial bottom line that was rejected as a
sufficient basis for finding a conflict in the ABA's Formal Opinion 95-
390.250 However, as indicated earlier,25' the analysis of the majority
opinion is both analytically unsound and in conflict with all existing judi-
249. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 250-53 (material financial impact as creating conflict in
concurrent-representation setting).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 178-85.
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cial authority on the point. In a world of practical reality and common
sense, the fact that a lawyer's representation against a non-client affiliate
of a corporate client will cause substantial and measurable financial loss
to the client fully describes an "adverse" representation. At the same
time, to accept the risk of any financial loss-no matter how insignifi-
cant or improbable-as sufficient to create a conflict would be untenable.
Among other considerations, such an approach would probably require
acceptance of the all-affiliates position, with its unexplained and unex-
plainable rejection of the entity-representation rule.25 2
The solution of the District of Columbia in its amended comments
is to insist on an appropriately high threshold of financial pain before a
breach of loyalty will be found. The relevant portion of the new com-
ment requires that the additional adverse representation must be such that
it "seeks a result that is likely to have a material adverse effect on the
financial condition of the organization client." 25 3 As can be seen, the
D.C. standard captures two points. First, the adverse result must be
"likely"-which in context clearly means that, measured by objectively
reasonable probabilities, the result is more likely than not. Second, the
financial impact must be "material"-which in context means that the
lawyer's work, if conducted successfully for the new client, must
threaten substantial and measurable financial loss to the lawyer's own
client.
(ii) Loyalty and Common-Officer Situations
Another common setting in which several corporate-family authori-
ties-including one of the oldest and most-cited 254-have found that an
impermissible conflict occurs when the law firm representing the corpo-
rate client finds that, in the new matter, it will deal with some of the
252. See supra text accompanying notes 124-31.
253. D.C. Comment, Appendix, infra I [14(c)]. The same phrase is repeated in a later comment
that is devoted entirely to the situation of material adverse financial impact. Id. at [16]. There,
however, the comment adds the following obscure caution (among other things, not indicating
whether the caution is simply one of prudence or has a substantive function as well): "... . However,
a lawyer should exercise restraint and sensitivity in determining whether to undertake such
representation [that is, one not threatening such an impact], particularly if the organization client
does not realistically have the option to discharge the lawyer as counsel to the organization client."
The client's lack of realistic ability to discharge the lawyer, of course, has nothing to do with either
the magnitude of harm to the client or the reasonableness of the client's motives in wishing to fire
the lawyer.
On the similar position of the RESTATEMENT, supra note 124. In PRoPosED FrNAL
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 212 cmt. (d), illustration 6, the test is described, in words quite
similar to the District of Columbia comment, as that of "material adverse impact on the value of [the
non-client affiliate's] assets and ... on the value of the assets of" the client entity. Id.
254. I refer here to Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264 (D. Del. 1980).
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same key people in representing the new client adverse to the affiliate.2 55
The reason for creating the prohibition is readily apparent when one con-
siders the operational significance of common personnel in the lawyer's
two representations. Suppose, for example, that-prior to the time the
question of conflict arose256-Parent had arranged matters so that a sin-
gle lawyer, functioning as General Counsel for it and all its affiliates,
would and did play a substantial, personal and hands-on role in all legal
matters involving either the corporation or its affiliates. In the course of
Lawyer's work for Parent, she frequently has substantive dealings with
General Counsel. Lawyer then undertakes to represent New Client
against Subsidiary. If, as would appear nearly certain, Lawyer will con-
front General Counsel across the table in conducting hostile negotiations
or across the courtroom in presenting New Client's case against Subsidi-
ary, the reasons for finding a conflict are clear. General Counsel should
not be placed in the position of having to confide in and place entire trust
and confidence in a lawyer or law firm that she must encounter as zeal-
ous representative of an adversary on other, or nearly-simultaneous,
occasions.
The same concept extends to non-lawyer officers of a corporation.
For example, the same vice-president for research might be substantially
and personally involved in the two representations-on one occasion
with a friendly lawyer and on the other facing a hostile lawyer, with both
lawyers being either the same person or lawyers from the same firm.
Again, the willingness of the officer to function effectively with the
"friendly" lawyer will, on obvious and reasonable grounds, be seriously
impaired by concern about the overall loyalty of the lawyer or law firm.
Whenever an officer or employee who will play an important and per-
sonal role in both representations is the same person, the new representa-
tion should not be accepted.
On the other hand, the concept is limited to individuals, and then to
those with certain kinds of operational functions-personal and substan-
tial involvement in both matters. It should not be enough, for example,
that the same office (either legal or non-legal), but not the same person-
nel from that office, will be involved in the two matters. It should also
not suffice if the involvement of personnel is in the role of non-confiden-
255. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264 (D. Del. 1980); see also, e.g., Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
256. This temporal limitation is important to prevent a corporate family from using the rule
manipulatively by reassigning matters to a common lawyer or other officer in order to create a
corporate-family conflict.
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tial functionary, rather than those of important witness or intermediary
with the organization.
The new District of Columbia comment contains a somewhat simi-
lar notion, although one that is inexplicably expanded to situations in
which either "the two companies have common directors, officers, office
premises, or business activities" or in which "a single legal department
retains, supervises and pays outside lawyers for both the parent and the
subsidiary." '257 The D.C. comment is both too broad and too narrow. For
example, a parent and subsidiary may have an office in the same prem-
ises, but if there is no operational connection between them, the common
premises alone would seem an entirely insufficient basis for treating the
two as one. Similarly, the fact of common legal department is only rele-
vant if that would have some operational significance in the law firm's
dual representation. If in the usual course two different lawyers in the
legal department would handle all significant aspects of the two different
matters, there is lacking the kind of direct, personal, and substantial com-
monality of personnel that would impair the organization's customary
way of conducting its business with lawyers. On the other hand, the D.C.
comment is too narrow in that it seems to require all its described traits
of commonality before recognizing a conflicts problem. As described
above, if the only point of commonality is the vital one that the same
person has functioned and will function in the new representation as the
general counsel for both the parent and the subsidiary, that would seem
to be a sufficient reason to recognize a representation-impairment
conflict.
V. LINEAL-DIMENSION CORPORATE CONFLICTS
There remains for consideration what I have termed lineal-dimen-
sion conflicts. Lineal-dimension conflicts encountered in corporate repre-
sentations are, in the general scheme pursued in this Article, those arising
from changes in the internal management, ownership, or control of what
is otherwise (or at least initially) a single entity, or at least a different
entity that did not present corporate-family conflicts problems.258 The
distinction between such conflicts and those in the lateral-dimension
257. D.C. Comment, Appendix, infra [15]. The comment seems to have gone astray because
of an unnecessary coherence to alter ego considerations.
258. For many years, for example, courts have had to wrestle with conflicts problems presented
when a law firm that had traditionally represented a corporation, including advising its board of
directors, is retained to defend both the corporation and its directors in a shareholder-derivative
action. See PRoposED FiNAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 212 cmt. (g); MODERN LEAL ETICS,
supra note 1, § 8.3.4, at 425-27.
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realm is to a large extent artificial, but separation serves an important
analytical point. As will be seen, lineal-dimension conflict issues should
be handled differently from lateral-dimension conflicts, sometimes with a
different way of measuring to determine whether a conflict exists, and
sometimes with different remedial consequences once a conflict is
encountered.
(1) Corporate-Family Transmogrification-In General
The conflicts problems presented to inside or outside corporate
counsel when and as a client corporation or its affiliates change owner-
ship or when management are numerous. Key among them is the ques-
tion who is empowered to direct a lawyer's activities and the required
focus of a lawyer's loyalty when a challenge to current management or a
management takeover is afoot.259 As interesting and important as such
questions are, they are outside the scope of this Article, dealing as it does
with multiple-entity situations, rather than multiple-contenders-for-con-
trol situations. The form of the question that particularly concerns the
identity of the corporate lawyer's client when multiple entities are
involved is that presented when a lawyer has advised management of a
company in the course of its sale and is later asked by the sellers of the
company to represent it in a subsequent dispute with the purchasers.
The ways in which such a conflict problem can arise is presented in
two New York decisions, which reached divergent results. In one, a
Southern District of New York decision,260 the federal court refused to
disqualify a law firm from representing its long-standing client, a seller
of a corporation who was now engaged in litigation with the purchasers.
The purchasers, who controlled the shape of the litigation as plaintiffs,
had joined as a co-plaintiff the sold corporation, which the lawyer had
also represented in the sale. In the other, a decision of the New York
259. The leading case is Financial General Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp 744
(D.D.C. 1981) (lawyer for corporation must follow instructions of incumbent management in midst
of developing battle for control of corporation; return of fees and punitive damages awarded to
corporation against its former lawyer for breach of fiduciary obligations, including undisclosed
attempt to seek control of corporation), vacated, 680 F.2d 768 (D.D. Cir. 1982) (no pendent
jurisdiction in federal court because of novelty of question under local law). See generally PRoPosED
FtNA RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 212 cmt. (h); MODERN LEGAL ETmcs, supra note 1, § 8.3.3.
260. Bass PLC. v. Promus Cos., No. 92 CIV. 0969 (SWK), 1994 U.S. LEXIS 136 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 10, 1994) (Kram, J.) (under "community of interest" standard, lawyer who represented seller
and company whose stock was being sold could represent seller in subsequent dispute with
purchaser and former corporation-now under new management--over alleged breach of sales
agreement). In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I served as co-counsel for the
prevailing law firm in Bass.
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Court of Appeals,261 the state court reached the opposite result on what
seem to be indistinguishable facts. The difference proved to be the analy-
sis pursued. In the state case, the court focused-over-much-on the
entity-representation concept, holding that the entity represented was the
former-client corporation that had been sold. Because the matters were
indisputably related in a factual way, the lawyer was disqualified. More
realistically, the federal court looked to the realities of the earlier and
later representations, noted that the lawyer continued to represent the
same community of interests as in the earlier representation, further
noted that there could have been no reasonable expectation on the part of
either the purchasers or the corporation being sold that the lawyer would
keep any information confidential from the sellers, and accordingly
refused to disqualify. The "community of interest" view would seem to
be highly preferable in a case having those characteristics.
(2) Corporate-Family Conflicts Caused by Client Mergers
and Acquisitions
Employing a variety of approaches, courts have generally refused to
find that a law firm has violated a duty to a client when it finds itself
opposing an existing client due to that client's merger and acquisition
activities.262 One common factual pattern finds a law firm well into its
representation of a client against an adversary when the adversary
acquires2 63 or is acquired by2" another client of the firm. While recog-
261. Teckni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 674 N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 1996) (under entity-
representation theory, lawyer who represented seller and corporation being sold was disqualified
from later representing seller against purchaser and former corporation-now under new
management-over alleged breach of sales agreement). For unclear reasons, the court in Teckni-Plex
did not cite or otherwise notice the existence of Bass.
262. The leading case is Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264 (D. Del. 1980) (law
firm whose client in unrelated matter was acquired as sister corporation of corporation that firm
opposed in another representation could elect which representation to resign in order to cure
conflict). See also Carlyle Towers Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Crossland Savings, FSB, 944 F.
Supp. 341, 346 (D.N.J. 1996) (law firm not required to be disqualified where conflict arose because
of opposing party's merger with parent of subsidiary that law firm had represented), citing
authorities; In re Wingspread Corp., 152 B.R. 861 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (no disqualification
required on grounds that law firm had no role in or control over acquisition, acquisition was
"attenuated" in that adversary was acquired by subsidiary of client and client was large with many
subsidiaries and holding companies). A leading and frequently-cited decision is Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui
Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1126-27 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (Joiner, J., sitting by
designation). Occasional decisions to the contrary can be found. E.g., Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Anixter
Bros., Inc., No. C-1-93-0871, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21012 at *7-8 (S.D. Ohio, June 27, 1994)
(without emphasizing, beyond noting, that conflict was created by merger activity of client,
disqualification ordered because of resulting conflict).
263. Carlyle Towers Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Crossland Savings, FSB, 944 F. Supp. 341,
346 (D.N.J. 1996).
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nizing that some curative step is necessary, courts have permitted the
firm to withdraw from representation of the acquiring parent, and they
have not required disqualification of the firm in the ongoing representa-
tion of its other client. The client-merger decisions are clearly excep-
tional. First, they are exceptions to the general rules prohibiting
concurrent representation adverse to a current client.265 Second, permit-
ting withdrawal as a cure to a conflict is also exceptional, because in
many decisions courts have applied the "hot potato" concept under which
a lawyer is precluded from curing a conflict by withdrawing from repre-
sentation of an objecting client.266
Nonetheless, the decisions are eminently sensible. The facts of those
cases seem not to suggest that the merger activity was motivated by the
thought that it would create a basis for a motion for disqualification to
benefit the adversary.2 67 But for other reasons visiting the consequences
of the objecting party's own voluntary merger activities on the client
who would be deprived of counsel seems an unwarranted imposition on
the latter's right to retain, and continue with, its chosen counsel. More-
over, in most of the cases that client would be seriously prejudiced by the
need (were disqualification required) to change counsel a substantial
period of time after the representation began. All the decisions to date
have been rulings on motions to disqualify, but a similarly flexible and
client-protective view should also determine whether a law firm has
acted properly in refusing to withdraw should the question ever arise in
another remedial context. For example, if the issue were asserted in a
disciplinary or legal-malpractice context, the firm's refusal to withdraw
should also be held proper.268
264. In re Wingspread Corp., 152 B.R. 861 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 162-69.
266. See generally PRoPosEE FINAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 201 cmt. e(i) & note; See
also id. at § 213 cmt. (c) & note.
267. That possibility was suggested by the court, but found not present on the facts before it, in
Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1126-27 (N.D. Ohio 1990); see
also Carlyle Towers Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Crossland Savings, FSB, 944 F. Supp. 341, 349
note 7 (D.N.J. 1996) ("Another reason why it is proper for plaintiffs counsel to choose their client,
in a situation where the defendant moving for disqualification created the conflict in the first place,
is that this result discourages the possibility ... where one party creates a conflict .... ")
268. Until the law is well-settled in a jurisdiction, uncertainty that might exist about the firm's
continuing the representation post-merger probably requires that the firm be permitted to withdraw,
even if that would cause prejudice to the existing client, in order to avoid any substantial issue about
the permissibility of continuing. Indeed, the merger line of decisions proceeds on the assumption that
the affected law firm has discretion whether to withdraw from representing the client involved in the
merger or the other client. See Carlyle Towers Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Crossland Savings, FSB,
supra note 267, at 349 note 7; see also Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., supra note
267, at 1127.
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A final important point is to note that acquisition-induced corporate-
family problems are hardly representative of the much more common
corporate-family problem of the lateral-dimension kind. The latter are
caused by the law firm's own actions in taking on a representation-
adverse to a longstanding or at least existing affiliate of a client. A con-
flict caused by the merger or acquisition activity of an existing client or a
present adversary, among other things, can often not be anticipated by a
law firm (unless, as will occasionally occur, the law firm also represents
the corporate client in the merger or acquisition). Even a quite elaborate
attempt to detect the resulting conflict would often be futile. The adverse
representation may have been undertaken when discussions concerning
the merger or acquisition were still private. Even if publicly announced,
and unless the law firm was aware of the pending transaction, the law
firm in good faith may have undertaken what is now claimed to be a
conflicting representation. Thus (and assuming that the two affected cli-
ents refuse to consent to the dual representation), the firm will be placed
in the position of having to choose between clients. As indicated above,
there is no basis on which it could be insisted that the firm always favor
the corporate-family client.
VI. CONCLUSION
Two kinds of resolutions are available in dealing with corporate-
family conflicts. Both have their appropriate role to play, but neither is a
complete solution. First, one apparent point of convergence for adherents
of both the all-affiliates and the no-affiliates positions is that a specific
contractual arrangement between a lawyer and a corporate member of a
larger family should be enforced. In other words, discrete agreements
between a lawyer and corporate-family client can define the relationship
in such a way as to limit or at least highlight the type of conflict obliga-
tions that the lawyer is and is not undertaking.269 Thus, in the view of the
no-affiliates adherents, if a lawyer agrees to "expand" the lawyer's con-
flicts responsibilities by agreeing not to represent a client against any (or
designated) other members of the corporate family, the contract should
be enforced.27° In the view of an all-affiliates adherent, the client can
similarly "expand" the exposure of its corporate family to conflicts.
269. On forms for law firm agreements with a corporate client on the limited representation of a
corporate-family affiliate, see, e.g., ABA Business Section Task Force on Conflicts of Interest,
Conflict of Interest Issues, 50 Bus. LAwy. 1381, 1387-91, 1392-95 (1995) (general discussion and
recommended form documents).
270. See, e.g., ABA Opinion 95-390, supra note 143, at 15-16 ("[i]f a lawyer explains the
implications of a dual representation and obtains the informed consent of both parties, 'the
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While doubt still remains about the extent to which advance agree-
ments between lawyers and clients suffice to waive future conflicts,271
clients who present corporate-family conflicts issues will often be
sophisticated in retaining and instructing lawyers. Often such a client
will have built-in independent counsel available to advise on such an
agreement in the form of in-house counsel. Advance-consent waiver by
such a client should be readily upheld, and several decisions have indi-
cated willingness to do so.272 Under the approach urged here, the burden
would be on the lawyer to initiate discussion about such an agreement
and to secure it from the client.273 On the other hand, courts should not
rely entirely upon a law firm's ability to self-protect through waiver let-
ters. To adopt an overly-strict conflict rule on the justification that law-
yers can contract around it would only encourage broad, preventive
required-waiver policies and practices in law firms. Ultimately, the justi-
fication may lead to engagement letters that contain such waivers as boil-
erplate in all instance. It may also encourage "battle of the forms"
situations in which the law firm and the prospective corporate client
exchange broadly worded and contradictory recitations of waiver and
non-waiver.
Second, accordingly, there is an important role left for sound default
rules defining and sensibly limiting corporate-family conflicts, regardless
of the possibility that many such conflicts could have been the subject of
explicit agreement. In addition to the difficulties sometimes encountered
in reaching a fair agreement on conflicts waiver, smaller law firms or
those in particular lines of legal work may only infrequently encounter
the kinds of problems discussed here, and they certainly should not be
penalized (or benefitted) because they had not thought to obtain advance
consent. Similarly, occasional corporate clients may insufficiently appre-
likelihood of perceived ethical impropriety on the part of the lawyer should be significantly
reduced."'); Rotunda, supra note 102, at 672-73.
271. Cf ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-372 (1993)
(criteria necessary for effective advance consent to future conflicts), with PROPOSED FiNAL
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 202 cmt. (d).
272. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency of Washington County v. Jelco Corp., 646 F.2d 1339
(9th Cir. 1981); Fisons Corp. v. Atochem North America, Inc., 1990 WL 180551 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Interstate Properties v. Pyramid Co., 547 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); City of Cleveland v.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); Elliot v. McFarland Unified School Dist., 211 Cal. Rptr.
802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-
372 (1993).
273. See supra text accompany note 217; Cf. supra text accompanying notes 213-19 (critiquing
position that burden is on corporate-family client to secure agreement from lawyer expanding scope
of conflict).
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ciate the importance of the question of corporate-family conflicts. They
similarly should not be penalized (or benefitted) because of the absence
of an agreement about advance consent.
Corporate families have existed in the United States certainly for all
of this century, yet lawyers, ethics committees, and academics have until
recent years neglected the area of corporate-family conflicts. The
problems presented are both important and fairly complex. The prefera-
ble method for addressing them requires attention to the background law
of corporations and conflicts, as well as appreciation of the business
world realities of corporate enterprises in which the varying situations in
which the questions of law firm loyalty are presented. Quick-fix tests-
always or never including affiliated entities along with the main entity
that the law firm represents-constitute either over- or under-inclusive
standards. Instead, the functional approach suggested and pursued in the
better-reasoned decisions seems far preferable in upholding appropriate
objectives of conflicts analysis for lawyers while appropriately respect-
ing the practical demands of both corporate and law firm operations.
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